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ABSTRA.C'r 
This thesis invcstigatcs and analyzcs thc principal featu res and sourCes of 
difficulties associated with the Time and Materials (T & M) contract and how 
these difti<.:ulties might be mitigated. Through personal interviews and a review 
of available literature , thc research suggests ways to structure and manage T & M 
contracts during the pre-award phase, including incorporation of possible 
incentives, to motivate both the Govern ment and the contractor to perform T & M 
contracts as effic iently as possible. further, the research examim:d the 
administration and monitoring of T & M contracts during the post award phase. 
in order to mitigate the diffic ul ties inherent during this portion of the contract. 
The research effort serves as a management guide which wi ll benefit both 
Procuring Contracting Officers (peO) and Administrative Contracting Officers 
(ACO) in the successful structuring and ad ministration of T & M contracts 
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I. I NTRODUCTION 
PURPOSE OF THE RES EARCH 
Contracting of ficers are faced with ma ny decisions in 
their capacity as the interme d i a ry through which Government 
requirements are s atisfied by products and s e rv ices provided 
f rom civilia n contractors. On e o f the key early decisions is 
the difficult choice of contract t ype considering the 
multitude of differ ent priCing me chani s ms a va ilable. The two 
general class ificat ions o f contracts are fixed-price and cost 
reimbursement. Within t hes e g e nera l class ifications, the 
Government has at its disposa l a tota l o f 21 different 
contract types to apportion t h e degree of ri s k t o e a ch p a rty 
[Ref. 1 :p. J09). 
This thesis will clos ely e xamine o ne such contracting 
method, the Time a nd Materials ('1' & M) cont ract, which is a 
hybrid contract, containing elements of both fi xed price and 
cost reimburse ment t ype contracts [ Ref. 2: p . 19 0 J. The t hesis 
will identi f y the current a reas o f difficu l ty associa ted with 
the use of T " M contr acts and suggest pre-awa rd and post 
awa r d features to inst i tute t o mitigate these potentia l 
difficulti e s. 
A comprehens i ve r e v iew o f current literature revea l e d no 
dedicated and compact sourc e for properly structuring nor 
adequately monitoring T & M contracts, despite their continued 
use within the Depdrtment of Defense (DOD). Through 
examination and analysis of current, but diverse, available 
data and interviews with key contracting personnel, a 
management guide was developed to consult during the pre and 
post award phases to help fill this void and to assist in 
minimizing the potential adverse effects of the T 50: M 
contract. Because the T 50: M contracting method has the 
potential to incur great cost risk to the Government, this 
management guide would benefit both the Procuring Contracting 
Officer (PCO) and the Administrative Contracting officer (ACO) 
in the efficient and effective execution of T Ii< M contracts. 
B. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will identify and propose a management guide 
for the proper structUl~ing and administering of T Ii< M 
contracts. The research will examine pre-award and post award 
actions the contracting officer can take to ensure efficient 
performance of the Government requirement. Although T 50: M 
contracts are used throughout the Government and commercial 
sectors, with only limited differences in ideology and usage, 
this research effort will focus only on DOD. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions were addressed during 
this research. 
1 . Primary Research Ou.stion 
What are the principal f ea t ures of the Time and 
Materials (T & M) contract t ha t are the sources of 
difficulties a nd how might these difficulties be mitigated? 
2. Subsidiary Rese.rch Ques tions 
• What are the principal characteristics of the T & M 
contract? 
• When are T & M contr acts commonly used ? 
• What a r e the common diff iculties o f T & M contracts? 
• What are the factors a n d c haracteri s tics of the T & M 
contract wh i ch lead to d iff icu l ties? 
• What have various buying organizat ions us ed in order to 
contro l T & M contra cts? 
• What checks a nd balances (inc e nt ives a nd deterre nts) could 
a buyer i mplement during the pre-award phase that would 
assist in motivating and ens uring the contractor performs 
a T & M contract a s efficient l y as pos sible ? 
• What performance sur veil l ance could be a p p lied during the 
post award pha s e to mitigate the p ot e n t ia l difficulties of 
using T & M contracts? 
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research methodo l o g y emp loyed d uri ng this study 
encompassed two prima ry ef f orts. 
1. Literature Review 
An extensive rev iew o f the avai l a b le literature 
related to T & M con t r acts was conducted with mat erials 
obtaine d from t he Dudley Knox Library, the Federal Procure nent 
Data Center ( FPDC), the Navy Procurement Management Report ing 
System (PMRS), and the Defense Logistics Studies Information 
Exchange (DLSIE). Additionally, a review of defense 
regulations and supplement ary directives, previous theses, and 
current publications and periodicals relating to contracting 
methods in general, and T & M contracts specifically, was also 
performed. The literature review was conducted to determine 
the extent and scope of T & M contract coverage, and to obtain 
background information on T & M usage, difficulties, and 
regulations governing their use. 
2. Interviews 
A series of interviews were conducted with several 
organizations responsible for the pre-award phase of T & M 
contracting. In addition, numerous interviews were also 
conducted with several organizations which were primarily 
engaged in the post award phase and monitoring of T & M 
contracts. Interviews were chosen over surveys for the 
"richness" of data that could be gathered from a personal 
interview over an often impersonal, survey. The interview 
process provided the opportunity to probe deeper into 
complicated areas than would be afforded using a survey. 
The majority of these interviews were conducted by phone due 
to the vast geographical area covered. These interviews were 
condUcted to ascertain what, if any, differences exist between 
actual field usage and control of T & M contracts, and what is 
prescribed in regulations. A list of interviewees and their 
activities is provided as Appendix A. Appendix B provides the 
interview questions. 
E. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Although a T Ii M contract is essentially a fixed rate 
contract regardin g its hourly cha rge, the thesis will focus 
primarily on the potential di f ficulties during the variable 
portion o f the contract, n a mely the var iab i l ity in labor hours 
charged during the per f ormance of the contr act. However, 
since diff iculties can also arise in the material portion of 
the T Ii M contract, material related problems will also be 
addresse d to provid e a complete pict ure o f T Ii M contract 
difficulties. 
This study will not address t h e pos s i bili t y ot a lternate 
contracting me thods available fo r use by the contracting 
officer but will take as a given t ha t the T Ii M contract is 
the only contractual veh icle available for a particular 
Government requi rement. Because the T Ii M cont ract is among 
the least preferable of the var ious contracting met hods and is 
normally us e d on ly as a last resort [ Ref. ) :p.l], t he analysis 
wi ll address how the contra c ti ng o ff ice r can best manage the 
T Ii M contract, given that a determination ha s been ma de that 
the T & M contract is the best pricing me chanism available fo r 
a particular Government requ irement. 
For t he pu rposes o f th i s study, it i s assumed that the 
reader is general l y fam i l iar with the procedures and 
terminology used in the Federal Government contracting 
environment. 
ORGANIZA'l'ION OF 'l'HE S'l'UDY 
In order to understand the overal l signif icance of T & M 
contracting within DOD, the thesis will first provide a 
general background and framework for the T & M contracting 
method in Chapter II. The chapter will define the principal 
features of the T & M contract, including its elements, 
general applications, limitations, and general surveillance 
requirements. This is followed by a discussion on the extent 
of T & M contract use within the Federal Government and the 
Department of the Navy. After this general background, an 
assessment of risk toward the Government is presented, 
illUstrating where T & M contracts rank in relation to other 
major contracting methods. 
With Chapter II as background, Chapter III contains a full 
analysis of T & M contract usage within DOD. The chapter will 
first present the traditional applications of T & M contracts 
as gathered from the literature review. Included is 
information on the Department of the Navy's use of T & M 
contracts as gathered from the PMRS. This is followed by a 
presentation of the many varied applications noted during the 
personal interviews. With this information as a foundation, 
an analysis of T & M contract usage, including range and 
depth, patterns, and trends, will be presented. 
Chapter IV will closely e:.o:ami ne the diff iculties with 
T & M contracts. Characteristics o f the T & M contract which 
lead to difficulties will first b e ana l yz ed as a f ramework for 
understanding the current problems f aced in DOD. A 
presentation of both a c t ua l p re-awa r d and post award T " M 
contract difficulties wi ll the n be made, highlighting the 
information gat h e r ed in perso na l interv iews and t h e literature 
review. The cha pter .... ill end with an a nalysis of these 
difficul ties . 
Chapter V a nal yz e s pre-award control s and proposes 
controls and/or incentives whic h can be i mpleme nted to 
mitigate the pre-award d i ff i cul t ies reported in Chapter IV . 
The controls advocated c a n ser v e as a ma nag e ment guide to 
reference d uring t he pre-a ward phase f or pr o per ly structur ing 
and initiating T " M contracts to mit i g a t e potential 
di!ficultii e s. Ch a p t e r V also i nc ludes a n e x a mina tion and 
analysis of two proposed inc e nt i ves wh ich might b e bu i l t-into 
the T " M contract t o i ncent i v ize both the Government and the 
contractor to perform the c ontract as e fti c i e n t ly as possible . 
Chapter VI ana lyzes post award contr o l s a nd proposes 
controls and surve i lla nce methods which can be implemented t o 
mi t iga te post awa rd d i ff icult ies. Inc l uded i s a n e:.o:a mination 
of general surve illance requirements , fac t o r s, a nd 
responsibilitie s. The co nt r ols propose d c an s e r ve a s a 
mana gement gu i d e t o r e f erence during post award f o r p r oper ly 
monitor i ng T " M contrac t s t o mitigate potential diff i cu l ti e s . 
Chapter VII presents the conclusions and recommendations 
of the researcher. Included are answers to the primary and 




This chapter provides back ground in f ormation on the Time 
and Materials ('1' , M) con tract. The c hapter will begin by 
defining the principa l f e atures o f the T , M contract, 
includinq a genera l descr iption and prese ntat ion of the T & M 
elements, genera l applications for T & M u s e, limitations 
imposed by regula tions, a nd g enera l surve illance r e quirements. 
This is followed by a discuss ion o n the extent of T & M 
contract use with in the Federal Government and the Department 
of the Navy (DON) . With th i s as a g eneral background, the 
chapter will conc lude with an assessment of risk toward the 
Government, illustrating Where T & M c ontracts r ank relative 
to other major contracting metho ds. 
PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF T , M CONTRACTS 
1. Description and Elements 
In general terms, T & M c o ntrac ts and the closely 
related Labor Hour cont ract are hybrids o f f ixed-price and 
cost reimbursement type cont rac ts (A Labo r Hour contract is 
essentially a var ia t ion of the T & M con t ract , d iffer ing in 
that only labor , a nd not materials, is s u pplied by the 
con t r actor ). La bor is provided on an indef inite q u a ntity, 
fixed-pr ice basi s and materials pro vided o n a cost 
reimbursement basis [Ref. 4:p.4-17]. As stated in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR): 
A t ime-and-materials contract provides for acquiring 
supplies or services on the basis of (1) direct labor 
hours at specified fixed hourly rates that include wages, 
overhead, general and administrative expenses, and profit 
and (2) materials at cost including, if appropriate, 
material handling costs as part of material costs. 
[Ref. S:part 16.60l{a) 1 
From the FAR descr iption above, two primary components 
constitute the priced line items on aT&: M contract; labor 
and materials. However, in actual usage reported by a large 
number of buying activities contacted during personal 
interviews, T &: M contracts generally contain three priced 
elements: labor; materials; and travel. In order for the 
Government to have adequate assurance that the costs incurred 
under aT&: M contract are reasonable, the contractor 
obviously must possess a valid accounting system to track 
these elements [Ref. 5: part 16 . 104 (h) ] . Reimbursement 
procedures for the different priced elements are outlined 
below. 
Labor Element 
The fixed labor rate in aT&: M contract is a 
fully burdened labor rate which covers the contractor I s direct 
(wages) and indirect costs (overhead and G &: A) and provides 
for a contribution to profit. The contractor may present 
labor vouchers monthly (or more frequently, if authorized by 
the contracting officer) for payment. The contractor must 
SUbstantiate labor vouchers by ev i dence of actual payment and 
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by i ndividua l dai l y t ime cards, or an equivalent . Payment of 
o v ertime p remiums mus t also be approved by the con trac ting 
office r in advance. Overtime rates must b e negotia terl. if no 
over time rates are p rovided in the contract sch edule and 
ov ert ime work is a pproved in advance by the contra ct i ng 
officer. Failure to a gree upon these overtime rates shall b e 
treat e d as a d ispute u nder the Disputes clause. [Re f . 5: part 
5 2.2 32 -7 1 
Al t hough the l abor rate is a fixed h o u r l y charge , 
considerable variabi l i ty in the total labor charge is present 
due t o the potential uncertainty in the number o f hours 
charged by the contrac tor in the performance of the contract. 
Th e re is also unc ert ai n t y i n the material costs since the 
n a ture o f the work effo rt, a nd hence the extent o f mat e rial s 
requ ired, is unknown a t t h e time of contract award. [Ref. 
"3 : p.31 
b. Material Blemen t: 
Ma terial i s priced by one of two methods. First, 
and t h e mos t common method, is for all material to be 
reimbursed at cost pl u s materi al handling costs [Ref 5 :part 
1. 6 .601b (2 ) ]. In this method , material handling costs must be 
clearly e xc luded from the labor -hour rate (i.e. material 
hand ling cost s wi ll not be included in t he overhead or General 
a nd Adminis tration (G & A) pool s used to determine the fixed 
hourly l abor rate). Material handling costs may include all 
appropriate indirect costs allocated to direct materials in 
accordance with the contractor's usua l accounting practices 
consistent with FAR part 31 [Ref. 5:part 16.601bP)]. The 
contractor will be reimbursed for materials by the Government 
only when actual payment for the materia l s is substantiated. 
Further, the contractor must attempt to obtain materials at 
the most advantageous prices available, taking all cash and 
trade discounts, rebates, allowances, credits, salvage, and 
commissions available. [Ref. 5:part 52.232-7] 
The second method of pricing material is an option 
outlined in the FAR, when the work to be performed for the 
Government requires the contractor to provide materials that 
it would normally provide to t he general pUblic during its 
normal business [Ref. 5:part 16.601b(3)1. This method can 
only be elected when the total estimated contract price does 
not exceed $25,000 or the estimated price of material does not 
exceed 20 percent of the estimated contract price. The 
material to be so charged must be identified in the contract, 
and again, no element of profit on material so charged can be 
included as profit in t he fixed hourly labor rates. Further, 
the contract must provide: (a) that the price to be paid for 
such material shall be based on an established catalog or list 
price, less all applicable discounts to the Government, and 
(b) that the Government shall pay no more than the sales price 
to the. contractor I s most favored customer or the current 
market price, whichever is lower. [Ref. 5:part 16.601(b) (J) J 
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Profit is not allowed on mater i a l costs since 
all reasonable ma t e ria l handling c osts may b e included in the 
charge for material , t hereby elimi nating all risk involved in 
the contract or obta ining materials t o s at i sfy the Government 
requ i rement [ Ref . 5 : part 52.232-7). Because profit is already 
included in the fi x ed labor hour charge to c ompensate the 
contractor f or the potentia l uncertaint y in a Government 
requ i rement, there is no need for further p r o f it compensa t ion 
for ma terial wh ich is reimbursed at cost. The Government's 
position is to compensate a contractor with p r o f it for his 
expected leve l o f risk ( Re t. 6 :p. 1 31 ]. Thi s i s a ccomplished 
in a T & M contract by allowi ng pro fi t as part of the f ixed 
labor hour cha rge, where u ncertainty c an exist . not in 
material cos ts where uncert aint y is low and a ll allowabl e 
material handling costs ar e i ncluded in mater i a l c os t s. 
A final requirement re lated to t he ma ter ial 
element (but also rel a ted to the labor e l ement ) is the 
a pproval of subcont r a ctors . The contract o r must obtain the 
contracting officer's wri tten consent b e fore p lacing any 
s ubcontracts for furnishing any of the wor k called f o r in the 
contract, excep t for t he purc has e o f raw mate r ials 
commercial stock items [Ref . 5: par t 52 . 2 44-3 (a) ] . 
c. Tr avel Element 
Although travel is n o t in the traditional 
definition of a T & M contract, i t is found often enough in 
13 
T & M contracts as a third priced element, in conjunction with 
labor and material, to warrant consideration here. The 
principal occasion travel is included is when the T & M 
pricing arrangement is combined with the Indefinite Delivery 
Type contract (IDTC). When included in a T & M contract, 
travel, including transportation, lodging, and per diem, is 
reimbursed at rates established in the Federal Travel 
Regulation (FTR) , Joint Travel Regulation (JTR), or the 
standardized Regulations section 925 [Ref. 5:part 3L205-46]. 
Because the travel element is rather straight forward and is 
not a "strict" T & M element, it will not be mentioned 
further. 
2. Application 
Appropriate applications of T & M contracts can be 
quite diverse, combining the T & M pricing arrangement with 
other contracting methods. The FAR states, 
A Time-and-Materials contract may be used only when it is 
not possib l e at the time of placing the contract to 
estimate accurately the extent or duration of the work or 
to anticipate costs with any reasonable degree of 
confidence. [Ref. 5:part 16.601(b) 1 
The presence of uncertainty in the exact times and/or 
quantities of future deliveries and the potential to have 
multip l e ordering activi t ies, at the time of contract award, 
often merges the T & M pr i cing arrangement with the Indefinite 
Delivery Type Contract (IDTC), or "0" type contract. A T & M 
contract can however, also be established as a definitive "C" 
type contract. Typ e "e" c ontr acts include definitive 
quantities, del i veries, and Statements Of Wo rk (SOW) for one 
buying activity. The "0" typ e va r i ant o f the T , H contract 
however , is much more commo n t han the " e " type. For this 
reason, a discussion of the bas i c aspe cts of the J OTe is in 
order to acquaint t h e reader with the c ommo n linkage of 
combining a T & M prici n g arrangement wi t h an J OTC. 
Indef in i te Delive r y Type Co ntracts, or "0 " type 
contra cts, are use d when t here is recurri ng demand f or an 
item, but the timing or full ext e nt of demand c a n not be 
determined wh e n the contract is "'rit t e n ( Ref. 7:p . 13]. The 
contract establishes a l l the terms that are certain, and 
delivery o r der s are not p l aced a gainst t he c ontract until the 
need arises . De livery orde r s from various orderi ng a ct i vities 
a re used to p l a c e s pecifi c and detailed delivery o r ders 
against the rOTC . Inde f ini t e Del ivery Type Contrac ts i d e nt ify 
t h e est imated cos ts, prices , and kinds of services or supplies 
to be delivered , but a r e p r evented by uncertainty at the t ime 
of contr act award f rom s t a ting precise quantities and/or 
de livery schedule s {Re f. 7:pp.11-1 3] . 
There are th r e e types of Indefinite Del ivery Type 
con tracts : I nd e fi nite Qua n t ity (IO-IQ) ; Requireme n ts 
Contr acts ( I D- RC) i and Definite Quantity (ID-DQ) [ Ref . 
5:subpart 16 . 5]. The I D-IQ supports delivery of an indefinite 
quantity o f designate d supplies or serv i ces for a specif ied 
contr act period , a nd states a minimum obligation by the 
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Government along with a maximum quantity, above which the 
contractor is not obligated to perform. The IO-IQ type is the 
most extensively used IOTC by the Navy [Ref. 8:p.3-3]. The 
ID-RC supports exclusive delivery from one supplier of 
specified supplies or services for a fixed period of time. 
Once in place, the contractor is treated as a sale source for 
all supplies or services specified in the contract. Unlike 
the ID-OQ type, their is no minimum order guarantee by the 
Government with a ID-RC, however, the contracting officer 
shall state a realistic estimated total quantity in the 
solicitation and resulting contract. The ID-DQ type supports 
the performance of specific services or providing specific 
materials at designated locations for a given contract period. 
Only the actual performance and delivery schedules are unknown 
at contract award. [Ref. 5:subpart 16.5] 
Any fixed-price or cost reimbursable pricing mechanism 
(or combination) cited in the FAR Part 16 can be used in an 
IDTC, which greatly varies the level of potential risk. Fixed 
price orders placed against IDTCs for services are classified 
as Type I delivery orders. Cost reimbursable orders 
(including T & M contracts) placed against an IOTC are 
classified as Type II delivery orders. [Ref. 7:p.13] 
Figure I, on the following page summarizes the above 
information and highlights the relationships and flexible 
qualities of the T & M contract. 
l6 
USAGE 
WHEN COMBINED WITH IDTCs 
NO DELI VERY ORDERS 
Figure 1 . T ' M cont r act Usage Var i ation s 
Source: Deve loped by Researcher 
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In actual use by buying activities, the T Ii. M pricing 
arrangement is most frequently combined with the IDTC-
Requirements Contract (IO-RC ) , or IDTC-Indefinite Quanti ty 
Contract (IO-IQ), with one or more requiring activities 
initiating delivery orders against the IDTC. As a further 
variation, they are also routinely established as multiple 
year contracts with a base year plus option years. Chapter 
III will closely examine T Ii. M usage within DOD. 
Limitations 
The FAR delineates two general limitations on the use 
of T Ii. M contracts which must be clearly documented in the 
contract file: the requirement for a Determination and 
Findings (D Ii. F) i and the requirement for a ceiling price. 
[Ref. 5:part 16.601(c) 1 
a. Determination and Findings 
Before a contracting officer can award a T & M 
contract, he/she must conc lude that no other contract types 
are suitable for procuring the needed supplies or services, 
and sUbstantiate this by executing a written Determinat i on and 
Findings (D Ii. F) [Ref. 5:part 16.601(c) J. The D Ii. F shall set 
forth enough facts and circumstances to clearly and 
convincingly justify the use of a T Ii. M contract over a less 
risky pricing arrangement and shall be considered final after 
approved by higher authority [Ref. 6:p.S7]. The requirement 
for a 0 & F f i nds its roots i n t he unite d states Code , Title 
10 and Title 41 (Ref. 9] [Ref. 10]. 
Approval l eve l s of the D , F vary only slightly 
between t h e differ ent milit a ry departments. Within the 
Department of the Air Force, a D & F must be approved at l east 
one level h i gher tha n the contrac ting o ff icer [Ref. 11 : part 
16.601) . Wi thin the De partment of the Na vy , f ield purch a sing 
activities without a ssigned counsel must obtai n appr oval of 
their cogniza nt regio nal procurement off ice or t h e Naval 
Supply Systems Comma nd ( NAVSUP) , before e n ter ing into 
T , M contracts [Ref. S:p.4 - 13) . The i nte n t o f the stringent 
D & F a pproval process i s t o encourage contra ctin g officers to 
thoroughly review any and a ll histori c a l cos t data , and award 
T & M contracts onl y a s a last resort. Once historical d a ta 
are availa ble, contracting of fi cers shou l d a void continue d use 
of the T & M contract a nd negotiate fixed - price contracts 
[Ref. 5:part 16.10 3 (C)). 
b. Ceiling Pri c e 
The T & M contr act must also inc l ude a c e iling 
p r ice that the c ontractor exceeds at i t s own risk [Ref . 5 : part 
16.601(C) ] . The Government shall not be obligated to pay the 
contractor any amount in excess of the ceil i ng price in the 
contract schedul e , and the contractor shall not be obliga t ed 
to cont i nu e per f o rmance if to do so wou l d exceed the ceil ing 
pr i c e, unless the contra cting off icer notif l es the contractor, 
in writing, that the ceiling has been increased and indicates 
the revised ceiling in the written notice. 
If at any time the contractor has reason to 
believe combined labor and material costs over the next 30 
days will exceed 85% of the ceiling price, the contractor must 
provide the contracting officer a revised estimate of the 
total price to the Gover nment with supporting reasons and 
documentation [Ref. 5:part 52.232-7 (c) ]. This clause provides 
the contracting officer advance notification of potential 
surveillance 
A T IX M contract provides little or no incentive for 
the contractor to control labor and material costs since 
additional hours spent on a contract result in increased 
profits to the contractor [Ref. 3:p.3]. Therefore, it is 
essential to perform appropriate Government surveillance to 
provide the Government reasonable assurance that efficient 
methods of cost control are employed by the contractor. 
The Government's rights to surveillance are broad. 
The Government has the right to inspect and test all materials 
furnished and services performed under the T IX M contract, at 
all places and times, including the periOd of performance, and 
in any event before acceptance [Ref. 5:part 52.246-6(c)]. The 
Government may also inspect the plant of the contractor or any 
subcontractor engaged in contract performance, provided the 
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ins pections do not unduly delay the work [Ref. 5:pa rt 52 .246-
6 (c) ). The Government may also require the contractor to 
replace or correct services or mater i a l s that at the time of 
delivery fai led to meet contract r e qu ireme nt s at any time 
during c ontr act performa nce , but not later tha n six months 
after accept ance o f t h e s ervices or ma ter i als l ast deliVered 
under the contr a c t. Th e labor hour cost of replacement or 
correction s hall be reduced to e xclude that por t ion of the 
rate attributable to profit. [Ref. 5 :pa rt 52. 2 46-6 ] 
Addi tionally . t he contracting o f ficer may request an 
audit of the invoices or vouc hers and subs t anti a ting mater ial 
at any time before fi nal p a yment under t h e c ontract [Ref . 
5 :part 52.23 2-7(e)) . The Department of Defense FAR Supplement 
(DFARS) also sta tes t he r e qu irement to distribute a copy of 
the T & M contract to the appropriate Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (OCAA ) office to ensure proper surveillance and 
increase visibil i ty of T & M contracts [ Ref. 12: part 204 . 201). 
These rather stringent require ments are due i n la rge part to 
the inheren t c ost risk of the T & M contract. 
C. EXTENT OF T , M CONTR1I.CT USAGE 
Table I on the f o llowi ng page is an illustrat ion of the 
ex.tent of T & M contract use within the Federal Government f or 
fi s c al year 199 2. l is t ing the total T & M contracting actions 
and their dolla r value for those departments or agencies 
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reporting T & M use to the Federal Procurement Data System 
(FPDS) [Ref . 13:pp.75-199 J . 
TABLE I 
SNAPSHOT OF FEDERAL TIME , MATERIALS 
CONTRACTING BY DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY 
FISCAL YEAR 1992 
DEPARTMENT I AGENCY 
Dept. of Agriculture 
Dept. of Commerce 
Dept. of Defense 
Dept. of Education 
Dept. of Energy 
Dept. of Health & Human Services 
Dept. of Housing and Urban Develop. 
Dept. of the Interior 
Dept. of Justice 
Dept. of Labor 
Dept. of state 
Dept. of Transportation 
Dept . of Treasury 
Dept. of Veterans Affairs 
Agency for International Develop. 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
General Services Agency 
National Aeronautics & Space Admin. 
National Science Foundation 
Nuclear Regulatory Commi ssion 
Office of Personnel Management 
Peace Corps 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Smithsonian Institution 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarm. Agency 























































Source: Data synopsized from [Ref. 13:pp.75-199] 
Table I s h o\ols that DOD is b y f ar t he g r ea t est user of 
T , M contracts withi n the Federal Gover nment , comprising 75% 
of the tot a l T " M contracting a c t i o ns and 65' of their total 
dollar value. It also s hows that T & M use is not exclu sive 
to DOD and in fact is pre va l ent throughout the Federal 
Government. The t abl e f urther illustra t es that since over 
$3.5 billion i n Federal f unds are al l oca ted u s ing T &: H 
contra cts, it is essential that contrac ting officer s fully 
understand t he i mpli c ations of their use. 
Table I I b e l ow di s p lays the extent o f T &. M contract use 
within the Department of the Na vy between fi s c al years 1984 














SNAPSHOT OFT' M USE WITHIN THE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1984 TO 1994 
I ACT IONS DOLLAR VALUE 
242 5 $ 274, 1 33, 000 
2 66 7 283 , 187.000 
3550 4 )0,289,000 
4124 54 7,8 37 , 000 
4 427 607, 0 28 , 000 
4555 652, 045,0 00 
5063 758, 3 59 , 000 
5495 844,182 , 000 
5311 885. 8 22 . 055 
51 9 5 878,090 , 211 
No te 1 1353 310, 721, 353 
Note 1 : oct ober 1993 through February 1994 on l y 
synopsized from [Ref. 14] 
Table II shows a 114 percent increase in the number of 
contracting actions and a 220 percent increase in the dollar 
value of T & M contracts i n the 10 year period ending in 
fisca l year 1993. It does however, also indicate t ha t T & M 
contracting actions and total dollars spent on T & M contracts 
have decreased somewhat since their peak years of 1991 and 
1992, respectively. 
Table IlIon the following page displays a breakdown by 
number of T & M contracting actions and to tal dollar value of 
T & M contracts solicited under various solicitation 
procedures for fiscal years 1989 to 1993. The upper port ion 
of Table III shows that over 50 percent of all T & M 
contracting actions are awarded by Full and Open Competition -
Competitive Proposal. It also shows that one in five T & M 
contract actions are Set Asides and slightly more than one in 
five T & M contract actions are awarded by Other Than Full and 
Open competit i on (but the ratio is improving). 
Interestingly, Table III also shows a marked increase in 
Architect-Engineer solicitation procedures using T & M 
contracts, particularly between 1992 and 1993 . Further, there 
has been a steady increase in both contract actions and total 
dollar value, in the u se of T & M contracts for Basic 
Research. These data indicate an expansion in the use and 
diversity of use of the T & M contract within the Department 




















T &; M CONTRACT SOLI CITATION PROCEDURES 
BY CONTRACT ACTIONS AND DOLLAR VALtTE 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1989 TO 1993 
NUMBER OF T &; M CONTRACT ACTIONS 
SELECTED SOLICITATION PROCEDURES 
A N 
5 2 2223 941 1323 
18 2 680 1134 1 2 19 
5 3025 9 92 1468 
308 1 1 1090 1120 
29 85 25 1125 1048 
DOLLAR VALUE OF T &; M CONTRACTS 
SELECTED SOLI CITATION PROCEDURES 
A 
10,565 283 , 018 191 719 134 . 2 16 222 , 910 
1 0 , 631 351.208 31 2 0 175.804 220 , 2 14 
4 72 403,08 6 0 81 149,184 291,186 
6 ,266 405,613 49 352 219,661 253,184 
5,188 451 , 751 6, 2 09 71 5 214,559 199,328 
TOTAL 
4 555 
50 6 3 
5 495 





7 5 8 ,359 
944,18 2 
885 .822 
8 79 , 090 
S OLICI TA TI ON PROCEDURES CODES 
A Full and Open Competition Sealed Bid 
B Ful l and Open Compet ition Competitive Proposal 
Archi t e ct - Engineer 
Basic Research 
Se t Aside 
Other Than Full and Open Competi tion 
Source: Synopsi z ed from [Ref. 14 1 
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Whereas Tables I through III show the overall extent of 
T & M contract use within the Federal Government and the 
Department of the Navy, Chapter III will discuss the specific 
appl ications of T & M contracts, both from a traditional sense 
and according to actual usage reported by various buying 
organizations. 
D. RlSI:: ASSESSMENT 
Figure 2, on the following page shows graphically how 
T & M contracts rank, in tenns of risk toward the Government, 
when compared to other major contracting methods, inc l uding 
the Finn - Fixed Price (FFP); Fixed Price with Economic Price 
Adjustment (FPE); Fixed Price Incentive (FPI); Cost Sharing 
(CS ) ; Cost - Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF); Cost-Plus - Fixed-Fee 
(CPFF); and the Cost - PluS - Award - Fee (CPAF) type contracts. 
The primary factor which places T & M contracts above all 
others in tenns of risk is the lack of contractor incentive to 
control costs [Ref. 3:p.3 1 . Under T & M contracts, 
contractors can earn additional prof i t by expending additional 
hours. The negotiated labor hour rate includes a percentage 
for overhead and G & A expenses which are f i xed costs. Once 
these fixed costs are covered, that portion of the negotiated 
labor rate attr i butable to overhead and G & A expenses becomes 
profit to the contractor for each additional hour expended. 
Also the negotiated hourly labor rate for T & M contracts 
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includes a percent-age of prof i t. There f ure, each additiona l 
hour e x pended resu l ts in additional profit. 
MINIMUM MAXIMO>< 
Figure?. Ri sk Anal ysis Continuum 
Source: Deve l oped by Researcher 
Othe r factors which contribute ::'0 this higher ris k as 
.!'eported in persona l interviews, which are not present in cost 
reimbursable contracts, i nc l ude the ir.centive for the 
cor.tractor to use lower skil l ed personael and Lhe ease of 
awarding T & M CO!ltracts. These and other [actors 
contributing tel difficu l ties wil l be fur ther discussed and 
ana lyzed in Chapter IV. 
The risk of a T & M conLract- can also be so greaL that the 
contract exceeds the bounds of the preceding continuum and 
becomes il l egal , as in Lhe case when the T & M contract 
resemb l es a Cos:.-P l us - a-Percentag e -o f - Cost lCFPC) contract. 
AlLhough the CPPC contrac:: was used extensively du ring ar.d 
preceding Worl d War 1, ::hc extensive abuses caused it tu be 
prohibited [Ref. 15 ) [Ref. 16]. The statutory language 
prohibits a "system of accounting " and not merely a type of 
contract. Generally, if the contract arrangement can assure 
the contractor greater profits by incurring additional costs, 
it is considered a CPPC contract and i s illegal. The 
Comptroller General has deve l oped a fourfold test for 
determining if an agreement/contract violates the CPPC 
provision [Ref. 17]: 
• Payment is on a predetermined percentage rate; 
• The predetermined percentage rate i s applied to actual 
performance costs; 
• The contractor's entitlement is uncertain at the time of 
contracting; and 
• The contractor's entitlement increases conunensurately with 
increased performance costs. 
All four factors must be present for the arrangement to be 
illegal. For example, aT & M contract calling for payment of 
overhead and profit at 15\ and lOt of cost respectively was 
found to be illegal since the predetermined rates were applied 
to actual costs after the fact, and the contractor and 
Government did not know the full extent of his future 
entitlement at the time of entering into the contract (Ref. 
18]. Although T & M contracts can have results similar to the 
illegal CPPC agreement, the Comptroller Genera l has upheld 
their legality provided a dollar ceiling was fixed in advance 
(Ref. 19 ] . 
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Although Figure 2 illustrates the "potential" risks of 
l' & M contracts relative to other contract types, it should be 
noted that these r i sks can be lessened through effect i ve 
planning and s tructur ing in the earl y stages and adequate 
con t rol and surveill a nce during post award. Only by 
u nderstanding the charac teristics of the T & M contract which 
contrib ute to difficu l ties c an a contracting officer 
e ffec tivel y mi tigate the potentia l risks associated with the 
T & M c ontract ing method. Chapter v will closely exa mine and 
analyze contract controls to implement during pre- award to 
mi tiga te these potential risks, whi l e Chapter VI will c l o sely 
e x amine a n d ana lyze post award surveill ance features. 
E. StrMHARy 
Chapter II has identified the background for T & M 
c o nt racts i n c lud i ng a presentation of the principa l features, 
encompas s ing its e l ements, general appl ica t ions, limitations, 
and general surveil l ance requirements. This was fol lowed by 
a general d iscussion o n the extent of T & M c ontract use 
within the Federal Government and the Department of the Navy, 
and an a nal ysis of ri s k toward t he Goverr.ment. The next 
chapter will discuss and analyze T & M contract usa g e with in 
DOD. 
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III. TIME AND MATERIALS CONTRACT USAGE 
INTRODUCTION 
A thorough understanding of T & M contract usage is 
essential to f ully comprehend the prevalence of this 
contracting method and the extent of potential difficulties 
that could be encountered. The degree of '1' & M contract use 
is by no means limited, but i n fact is significant within DOD. 
This chapter provides information and analysis of T & M 
contract usage within DOD to illustrate its significance. The 
chapter begins with a general discussion on traditional 
applications of T & M contracts as gathered from var i ous 
literature. This i s f ol l owed by a presentation of data 
gathered from the Navy Pro curement Management Reporting System 
(PMRSj which illustrate the specific types of supplies and 
services obtained unde r the T & M contrac t ing method within 
the Department of the Navy (DON). Finally, specific reported 
applications ot T & M contracts noted during personal inter-
views with var i ous DOD buying activities will be presented to 
further display the diverse applications of T & M contracts. 
The chapter wil l end with an analysis of actual T & M 
contract usage in the field as corr.pared to the traditional 
usage outlined in the literature. This analysis will focus on 
an examination of differences in range and depth. Finally, an 
analysis of patterns and trends in actual T & M contra c t usage 
is al s o presented. This analysis wil l include a proposed list 
o f f actors which summarize and support the Ilse of T & M 
TRADITIONAL APPLICATIONS OF T & M CONTRACTS 
A literature review reveal ed a limited number of T & M 
c ontract a pplications. The FAR states, 
AT & M con tract may be used only when it is not possible 
at the time o f placing the contract to estimate accurate l y 
the extent or duration of the work or to anticipate costs 
wi th any reas onable degree of confidence. 
[Ref.5 :partl6. 60~ (b) 1 
NO fu r ther guidance i s provided in the .FAR, leaving 
substantial opportunity for contracting officers to determine, 
f or t hemselves, appropriate uses for T & M contracts. The 
DFARS also provides no genera l g uidance on appropriate uses of 
T & M cont racts . 
Othe r available lite r atu re describes l' & M contract u s e in 
v e ry g e ne ra l terms. An Air Force audit report states, "Time 
and Materials contracting is appropriate for the init ial 
stages of p r ograms wi th urgent and compelling requirements 
that could not be expedi tiously met using other contrac t 
types ." [Ref. 3: p .1] Time and Materials contracts are often 
used for repair and overhaul services when t.he condition of 
items to be repaired cannot be predicted with confidence and 
t.here is no previous experience to indicate the amount of 
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repairs that may be required [Ref. 20:p.287j. They are also 
used for engineering services and research [Ref. 21:p.7J. 
The literature review revealed a very limited range of 
T &r M contract use. To summarize, the major categories noted 
repair and overhaul; engineering services; and research 
and development. 
C. T &. M CONTRACT USE WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
Data were gathered from the Navy Procurement Management 
Reporting System (PMRS) DD350 database to amplify the general 
data found in the literature review and to determine, more 
specifically, the types of supplies or services obtained under 
the T & M contracting method. Table IV presents a partial 
synopsis of the top five items procured using T & M contracts 
for fiscal years 1990 to 1994 within DON. 
Table IV shows that the largest majority of T & M 
contracting within DON can be grouped into nine broad 
categories: Engineering and Technical Services; Research, 
:Jevelopment, Test and Evaluation (RDTE); Program Management &r 
Support Services; Installations; Maintenance and Repair; AUP 
Systems Development & Facility Operations; Logistic Support 
Services; Technical Representative (TECHREP) Services; and 
Marine Architect Engineer (A-E) Services. 
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TABLE I V 
TOP FI VE T " H CONTRACT ITEMS PROCURED 
FOR THE DEPT. OF THE NAVY; FY90 TO FY94 
I TEM I ACT I ONS 1 DOLLARS 
1 9 9 0 
Engineering Technical Services I 
RDTE 
Pr og r am Management/Rpt / Support Svc 
I n s t allat ions 
I ~intenance and Repair 
1 9 9 1 
I;~~~;~:~~~n:nd Repa i r 
IADP . Sys tem Development/Facility Ops I 
Eng~neering Technical Services 
Log~sti c Support Services 
1 9 9 2 
Engin ee r i ng Technical Services 
I nstal la t i ons 
Ma i ntena nce a n d Repair 
Prog r am Management/Support Svcs 
Log i s t i c Support Servi ces 
1 9 9 3 
I 
IMaintenance and Repair I I ~~gineering and Technical Services 
1 ~~i~~!~e!UE~~~1o~:~~/~:Cil ity Ops 
ITECHREP Services 
7 11 1$92, 487 , 00 0 
4 72 71 , 44 3 ,000 
277 6 5 , 538,0 00 
596 62,503,0 0 0 
528 61, 78 4 , 0 00 
383 J 82,428, 00 0 588 77 , 767 , 0 00 
6<4 7 7 , 67 1 ,000 
582 72 ,2 72,0 00 
532 6 8 ,820 ,0 0 0 
510 1113, 2 58 ,6 1 8 
699 9 8 ,725 , 63 2 
695 81, 3 1 2 , 0 79 339 78, 782 , 414 
488 61,316 ,976 
716 1'290, 86 0 ,9 2 7 
610 103 , 340 ,10 9 
525 77 , 250 , 6 14 
351 54 , 933 .92 1 
330 30 , 155,861 
1 9 9 4 (Oct. 1993 t.hrough Feb. 1994) 
I
Elt' neering and Technica l Services 1 ine Architect - Engineer Svcs 
intenance and Repai r 
gram Management /Support Services 
System Deve1cpmenL/Facility Ops 
Source ; SynopsJ.zed from [Ref. 14] 
33 
210 1 49'380'329 
11239,717,262 
150 36.327,32 6 
124 34,857,6 7 9 
131 28.758.706 
Table IV however, does not truly portray the great variety 
of supplies or services procured in the Navy using the T & M 
contract. Appendix C is provided to further illustrate an 
example of the full breadth of items procured by the Navy 
under the T & M contract. Appendix C is a complete listing of 
the different supplies/services procured in the Navy in fiscal 
year 1993 using the T & M contracting method. The list 
includes the total number of contract actions by category and 
their total dollar value. 
D. SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF T &: M CONTRACTS 
Personal interviews with several DOD buying activities 
were also conducted to complete the picture on T & M contract 
use within DOD. The interviews revealed many varied 
applications of the T & M contract. This section will provide 
a sampling of the variety of supplies or services that are 
procured using T & M contracts. The various applications will 
be discussed in the order of their reported frequency of use. 
In all, 17 buying activities were contacted and asked to 
describe the various supplies or services procured under the 
T & M pricing arrangement. A list of interviewees and their 
activities is provided in Appendi x B. Each activity was asked 
to report all appropriate categories to illustrate the total 
rea l m of their T & M contract usage. Al though some similarity 
exists hetween categories, subtle differences exist to warrant 
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a breakdown into 12 separate categories. Table V below 
sununa r izes the responses to Lhis interview ques t i on . 
Desc r i p t ions of each c ategory follow Tabl e V. 
APPLICATIONS OF T " M CONTRACTS 
REPORTED DURING PERSONAL INTERVIEWS 
TYPES OF SUPPLIES OR SERVICES 
PROCURED US ING T " M CONTRACTS 
Repair & Ove r haul i ncl . Troubleshooting 
TECHREP Servi ces 
Engineering Services 
Re s e arc h & Develo pment 
Initial DLR Repa i rs 
Des i gn Services 
Envi r onmental Archi tect - Engineering Svcs 
Ha z a r dous Waste clean-up 
computer Softwa r e Development 
Gro u ndsk:eepi ng & Maintenance 
Development & Providing of T raining 
Ze ro T & MUse 
Tota l Number Buy i ng Activities Contacted 












1. Re pair, OVerhaul, and Troubleshooting Services 
Repair, overhaul, and troubleshoot ing services was t h e 
most conunon category of T & M contract use. Nearl y al l b uying 
activities contacted ( 14 of 17) reported use of T & M 
contracts for these services with diversity on l y in the type 
of e quipment or system involved. Exampl es of different 
e qu ipment/systems reported in this category included: 
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• Test and evaluation of shipboard electronic systems. 
• Calibration of gauges. 
• Software debugging. 
• Troubleshooting and repair of telecorrununications 
(telephone) equipment. 
• Troubleshooting and repair of Command & Control Switching 
Systems (Red Switch Network) . 
• Troubleshooting and repair of various mechanical, 
electrical, electronic, or hydraulic systems. 
Contracts for the perfonnance of maintenance, 
overhaul, modification, troubleshooting, and repair of various 
items often contain Over-and-Above work requirements 
(sometimes referred to as "open and inspect" provisions) [Ref. 
12: subpart 217.77]. When incorporated in a contract, Over-
and-Above work requirements must be established as separate 
line items on the contract. The Over-and-Above concept tasks 
the contractor to open u p a piece of equipment and identify 
needed repairs and then recommend corrective action to restore 
the system during contract performance. The contractor 
submits a separate work request to identify the Over - and·Above 
work and, as appropriate, the Government authorizes the 
contractor to proceed. [Ref. 12:subpart 217.77] 
Seven of the fourteen activities reporting use of 
T & M contracts for rep air, overhaul, and troubleshooting 
ser:vices, incorporated Over·and-Above work requirements. The 
Over-and-Above concept frequently comb i ned the T & M pricing 
mechanism with the FFP pricing mechanism as two separate 
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c ontract l ine i t ems. A common appl ica t i o n reported was to use 
a T & M p r i c i ng arr a ngement for t he open a nd inspec t l i ne item 
o f the repa ir to determi ne the extent o f work required to 
full y rest.or e the equ ipment or sys t em . The contracto r t hen 
prepared a wr i t t en est.imate of remaini ng l abor and ma t eri a ls 
to complete the job under a FFP line i te;I\ . Performance d o es 
no t resume unti l a FFP c ontract is negotiated for comp letio n 
of the wo rk. 
2 . Te c hni c a l Representat i v e (TECBltEP) s e rvice s 
Technical Represent ative iTECHREP) servi ces also had 
a h i g h incidence of T 6< M contract usage, where it was ci t ed 
b y over ha l t of the b uying a ctivities c ontacted (9 of 1 7 ). 
Pr oductio n cont r ac ts , which are norma Lly fixed pri c e , 
g eneral l y have a l i ne item tor TECEREP services , af ter the 
sys tem i s initially fielded , which are pric ed under a T & M 
pricing a r r angemen t. Repair and troubleshooting services by 
TECHREPs a re common l y established under T & M contracts for 
s eve r al 
Fi r s t , the exte nt of repair work required for ne wly 
t i elded s y s tems , components, or equipment.s is often diff i cult 
t o p r edi ct. wi t.h cert.ainty. A T & M cont ract is deemed more 
appropria t e t han 
cond it ions . 
f i xed· pri ce under these 
Second, T & M cont.racts are extremel y responsive to 
dynami c tleet needs . The contracting activity es tablishes an 
Indefinite Quantity IDTC (ID-IQ) with a contractor for TECHREP 
services, negotiating up-front various different types of 
technicians and their associated labor rates. The requiring 
activities then place delivery orders with ceiling prices, as 
the need arises, for: TECHREPs to ride Navy ships for Sea 
Trials, or other important evolutions, to ensure new systems 
function properly; TECHREPs to fly out to Navy ships to assist 
in a Casualty Report (CA$REP) repair of a vital piece of 
equipment; or other specific repair requirements of active 
fleet units. 
Third, M contracts, and subsequent delivery 
orders, are quickly awarded for emergent repairs. Since 
labor rates are fixed and negotiated in advance, it is only a 
matter of determining the type of technician needed and 
estimating a ceiling for labor hours and materials. This 
process takes only a couple of hours, whereas a cost 
reimbursable contract often takes days weeks to award, 
causing undue delay. 
Fourth, T & M contracts with ceiling prices are 
desirable by requiring activities due to their ease of 
budgeting. The actual maximwn repair cost is known up- front 
(unless the ceiling price is exceeded) allowing for more 
accurate budgeting. This budgeting advantage does not apply 
under a cost reimbursable contract since it often takes months 
to ascertain the exact cost of the repairs. 
38 
3 . Engineering Services . 
Whe reas repa i r, ove r haul, and troubleshoot i ng refe rs 
restoring a system whi ch is not functioning, the 
engineering services ca tegory encompasses tasks such as 
installation, modif ication, tuning, or removal of s ys tems, 
components , or e quipments. Engineering services a lso include s 
enhance ments and design changes to improve system perfo rma nce. 
A FFP contrac t would normally be used if the nature of t he 
wo rk effort could be accurately predicted, however whe n the 
uncertainty of the work effort was too great, a T & M contra ct 
was used . 
4. Research and Development (R " DJ 
Us e o f the T & M pricing mechanism for R&D was nat 
o nly limited in frequency but limited in depth. The R& D was 
gene r a l ly in t he fo rm of a limited duration fast-enginee r ing 
s t udy to have an expert consultant conduct a quick p robe or 
invest igat i on into a particular engineering problem area. 
Althou gh similar to troubleshooting, i t is concerned more with 
improving system performance rather than rest o r i ng 
malfunction i ng systems. 
5. Initial Depot Level Repairable (DLR) repairs. 
Al though th i s category is similar to the first 
category mentioned, one activity report e d a unique argument 
for its intentional use of T & M contracts for repair efforts. 
This a ct ivity n oted that ini tial repairs of various DLRs in 
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general. and the TARTAR system specifically (the TARTAR system 
is a shipboard medium range missile system used by the Navy) • 
are sometimes performed under the T & M contracting method due 
to advances in bar - coding technology. Under previous 
procedures, DLR t roubleshooting and repair for DLRs returned 
during the early stages of fielding the system, were usually 
conducted under fixed -price contracts which may not have been 
advantageous to either the Government or the contractor. 
Examples of the two pricing mechanisms are provided to 
illustrate the advantage of using a T & M pricing arrangement. 
a. Troubleshooting Under a Fixed-Price Contract 
The TARTAR system has a large majority of its DLRs 
bench- tested and troubleshot over the same piece of test 
equipment. As an example, if 100 of these items were 
troubleshot in the past , for a total of 1500 hours, their 
average troubleshooting time would be 15 hours each. These 15 
hours would be used as a basis to establish a fixed-price 
contract _ In reality however, some low cost items took fewer 
(or more) hours, while some high cost items took more (or 
fewer ) hours. Compounding the uncertainty, TARTAR DLRs 
experienced great variability in the nature of their 
troubleshooting and repairs. Technology was not available to 
track individual DLR repair histories to use as a basis for 
accurately estimating future repairs. Under a fixed - price 
contract, either the Government or the contractor could l ose 
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s u bs tantially when only the average price was used and a ctual 
r epa irs d i ffered from the average price estimate. 
b. Troubleshoo ting Under aT&. M Contr a ct 
Wi th new technology however, certain individual 
DLRs are bar- coded a nd encoded with all applicable repair 
informa tion , providing a complete repair history (this lev e l 
o f tracking was previous l y only conducted on h i gh dollar 
items , such as aircraft er-gines). These "back-up data, " as 
they are called, are now requested by the Government t o 
support hours charged under a T & M contract. This pricing 
arrangement benefits both the Government and the contrac tor 
since the Government is only paying for actual repa i r time and 
t h e con t r actor is nat hurt if their estimates are i nac c urate 
(as in the case of t he fixed - price example). Over t i me, if 
cons i s tency is s hown for the same, specific repairs for 
i tern, a f ixed-price contract would be used. 
6 . Des i gn Services 
In the speCific application cited by the buying 
activity, the design services were for the design o f 
c ustomi zed habitabi l ity packages for shipboard appl i cations. 
The services were established as an ID-IQ, with the Government 
promis ing to award any and all shipboard habitabi lity des ign 
wor k for a stated period to the contractor that submitted the 
lowes t responsive and responsib l e fixed- labor rate bid. 
7. Environmental Architect 5: Engineering (A - E) Sbort 
Studies 
The environmental con t rac t ing division of one Air 
Force co:mnand included a T & M pricing mechanism to provide 
environmental, engineering, and scientific support services to 
prepare short studies to ascertain how to effectively remove 
Hazardous Waste (HW) from various ground sites . These 
contracts were also established as 1D-10 contracts, with 
several cont ract o r s , to stimula te competition. As of the date 
of t he interview however, no delivery orders had been i ssue d 
against t he T & M line items. 
8. Emergent Hazardous Waste (BW) Clean- up Services 
The above environmental contracting division also 
incorporated a T & M pricing arrangement into some of their 
environmental contract s for eme rgent HW clean-up services. 
The T & M line item was added as a contingency for emergent HW 
spill incidents when time was not available to put together a 
proposal and carry out t he normal contracting process. The 
init ial contract was established as a comple t ion t y p e 1D-10 
contract with r equiri n g activities initiating delivery orders 
as the need arose. As of the date of the interview, n o 
delivery orders were initiated against the IDTC for emergent 
clean - up services . 
9. COlllputer Software Development " Grounds Maintenance 
One buying activity recalled seeing T & M contracts 
used for software and grounds maintenance in t h e past but 
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stated neither wou ld l ike l y be candidates Eor current T & M 
contracts since other pricing mechanisms woul d be mo re 
appropriate. Speci fi cal ly , computer software development. 
would lik e ly be under a cost reimbursable contract , whi le 
g roundS ma in tenance wou ld be awarded as a FFP under sealed bid 
proce dures. 
10. Development of Navy Training Courses 
One very creat.ive use of the T & M contract was 
institut e d by the Navy Regional Contracting Center, Long Beach 
Detachment f o r the Verti cal Launch System (VLS) training 
p rogram. The training program included contractor - provided 
inst ruc tors for tra ining Navy personnel in VLS, and contracto r 
deve lopme nt o f VLS training material for ultimate purchase and 
use by the Na vy. The T & M pricing mechanism was chosen over 
a F FP contract due to its flexibility, ease of administration , 
and respons iveness to fleet needs. 
Adequate pricing infonnation was available o n 
instructor l abor costs, material costs, and course lengths to 
award FFP contracts, however, the multitude of possible 
training course combinat ions made use of a number of FFP 
contracts administra t ively burdensome. Course durations and 
specific instructor requirements varied greatly in the Navy 's 
VLS training requirements. The market for VLS training wa s 
also extremely competitive, with numerous companies eager to 
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win the contract; in some cases bidding labor rates below 
costs. 
In this envirorunent, the contracting officer found it 
much easier, and more responsive to customer needs, to 
establish fixed-labor rates for various categories of 
instructors and training material preparers on an IDTC. This 
allowed user/customer conunands to initiate del i very orders, 
putting together different combinations of tailored training 
requirements, to meet their training needs. A separate 
delivery order would be prepared for each training need 
delineating the nwnber of instructors required, duration of 
training, etc., and a ceiling on the number of hours. 
The T & M contract was beneficial to both the 
contractor and the Government. The contractor benefitted from 
this arrangement due to the ease and speed of administration, 
thereby keeping the overhead contribution of VLS training very 
low. This allowed the contractor to still make a profit since 
the overhead rate for VLS training was lower than their 
overall corporate overhead rate. 
The Government customer also benefitted through much 
reduced Procurement Administrative Lead Time I PALT) , excellent 
flexibility to tailor fleet training needs, and ease of 
budgeting. Un l ike the situation in a cost reimbursable 
contract where the customer activity may not know for months 
how much a service will ultimately cost, the T & M pricing 
arrangement with a ceiling price allowed the customer to know 
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the tll11 extenl of their obligation up frar.t . The T &: M 
arrangement also provided minimal to no opportunity for abuse , 
since the Ilser could clearl y define t.heir requirement in the 
total number o t labor hours on the deliver y order, and since 
the level of competition was extremely high. 
11. Zero Us e of T &: M Contracts 
One Supervisor of Shipbui l ding, Conversion and Repai r 
(SUPSHIP) activity reported zero use of T & M c ontracts e ven 
t h ough the natu re of their work would traditionally be a h ave n 
for T &: M u se. This was a personal choice of the con tracting 
o ff ice r who deemed the inherent risks of the T <;. M contract t o 
be unacceptabl e . The contracting officer mainly a warded COSt~ 
Plu s -Fixed- Fee (CPFF) and Cost - Plus-Award - Fee (CPAF) 
E. ANALYS IS OF T &. M CONTRACT USAGE 
The analys is of T & M contract usage will fo cus on an 
examination of differences in range and dept h be t.ween 
trad it iona l uses outlined in the 1 iterat.ure review and actua l 
uses reported hy DOD huying act.ivities. This is fo l l owed b y 
an appraisal of patterns and t r ends noted in actual 
applicat ions. 
~ . Range 
The literature review revealed T & M contract usage in 
very general terms. For example, the FAR stated, 
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A T & M contract may be used only when it is not possible 
at the time of placing the contract to estimate accura tely 
the extent or duration of the work or to anticipate costs 
with any reasonable degree of confidence. [Ref. 5;part 
16.601(b)] 
This application l eaves considerable interpretation to 
contracting officers since no mention is made of any spec ific 
applications. The remaining literature outlined earlier in 
this chapter suggested only three broad categories for T & M 
repair and overhaul; research and development; and 
engineering services. These three broad categories do indeed 
encompass a large portion of actual T & M contract use 
however, the actual use of T & M contracts by buying 
activities suggests a much broader range. 
In addition to the three broad categories outlined in 
the literature, Tables IV and V, and Appendix C indicate a 
much broader range of T & M contract usage. Figure 3 on the 
following page i s provided to propose a much broader range of 
T & M contract usage. 
2. Depth 
The depth of actua l T & M contract use is much greater 
than that suggested by the literature. Armed only with 
generalities in the literature for use of T & M cont racts, DOD 
contracting officers have developed many creative uses of this 
contracting method, as i llustrated in section D of this 
chapter. Appendix C also clearly indicates a multitude of 
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var ious serv ices which have been procured within the 15 
proposed categories out l ined in Figure 3. 
T • M CONTRACT CATEGORIES 
REVEALED DURING 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
II I Tot al Categories: 
II 
Repair & Overhaul 
Resea rch & Development 
Engineering Services 
T & M CONTRACT CATEGORIES 
REVEALED FROM ACTUAL USAGE 
DATA AND INTERVIEWS 
II 
Total Categories: 15 I 
II 
Repair & Ove rhaul 
Research & Developmen t 
Engineering Services 
TECH REP Services 
Engineering Design Svcs 
Engineering Techni cal SVC9 
Program Management SVC9 
Logistic Support Services 
Marine A - E Services 
Envirorunental A - E Svcs 
Hazardous Waste Clean- Up 
ADP System Devel opment Svcs 
Training & Consul tant Svcs 
Facilities Ops & Support 
Other Professional Svcs 
Figure 3 . Range Difference in T & M Contract Ca tegories 
Source: Developed by Researcher 
3. Patte rns 
Several patterns in T & M contract use were noted 
during the personal interviews. These patterns are outlined 
on the following page: 
• In all cases, a ceiling price was established and a D & F 
was completed by the buying activities as required by the 
FAR. 
• No T & M contracts were observed for supplies; all were 
for services. 
• All but two buying activities (t3e activity using bar-
coding technology for DLR repairs and the activity using 
T & M contracts for VLS training requirements) indicated 
that the T & M contract was awarded because historical 
cost infonnation was not available and uncertainty was too 
great to award a FFP contract. 
• Nearly all the T & M contracts discussed were base year 
plus option year contracts; with the average being one 
base year plus two option years. 
• All T & M contracts discussed were "D" type rDTCs with 
Type II Delivery orders. No buying activities contacted 
reported use of "COl type T & M contracts, although each 
buying activity acknowledged that T & M contracts can be 
"C" type contracts as well. 
• All activities indicated that rOTC T & M contracts were 
useful when it was not possible to predict when specific 
work must start or for situations when work must start 
quickly, allowing fo r great flexibi lity. 
• A majority of the activities preferred only using T & M 
contracts when the work to be perfonned was located on 
Government facilities to allow closer surveillance. 
• All activities stated that T & M contracts made budgeting 
very easy for the requirements activities since costs were 
known at the outset (unlike in a cost reimbursable 
contract) . 
• Well-defined labor categories and a relatively low total 
dollar va lue were viewed as desirable by most buying 
activities before awarding T & M contracts. 
• All activities noted a financial advantage to the 
Government when the contractor was locked into a fixed-
labor rate during times of inflation. 
• All contracting officers indicated competition was highly 
desired before awarding a T & M contract. 
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A corrunon d e nomi nator for using T & M contracts, noted 
by a l l buy ing act i vit i es , i s uncertainty in the nature/ e x ten t 
of s ervices. This implies t hat uncertainty in the magnitude 
and bou n d s o f the work effort i s a domi nant factor in c h o os i ng 
a T & M p ricing arrangement . The patterns above also s uggest 
s e ver a l other fa ctors which shou l d be cons i dered bef o re 
c hoosing a T & M contract. Figure 4 below s :.unmar i z es the 
fac t ors wh ich shou l d be considered before selecting a T & M 
p r icing arrangement. 
I FACTOR 
u nce r ta i n ty 
Da t a Availa bility 
I rre gu l a r i t y 
Loca tion 
Surve i llance 
Va l ue 
Emergency 
Labor Categories 
compe t it ion 
Budge ting 
BE ST WHEN • •• 
d u ration of work effort is uncertain. 
c ost or pricing data are not ava i lable 
cannot predict when work is needed. 
wo r k is performed at a Govt . f a ci l ity . 
Govt has adequate monitoring r esourc e s 
c ont ract is for a low dol l ar v a l ue. 
wor k needs to start quickly . 
vari ous labor categories wel l - de! ined . 
level of competition is high. 
c erta inty is required in final cost . 
Fi g u re 4 . T & M Contrac:t Usage Fa ctors 
Source: Developed by Researcher 
4. Tr ends 
I 
Two distinct yet oppos i ng trends i n T & M contract u s e 
were obs erved [rom t he personal int ervie ws and from the data 
acquired f r om the Navy PMRS. Each is discussed below . 
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a. Increase in Government Use of T &; M Contracts. 
Interviews wi th contracting officers indicated a 
reluctance to award T & M contracts unl ess a majority of the 
factors out l ined in Figu r e 4 were present however, there has 
been a marked increase in the use of T & M contracts. Table 
I I from Chapter II shows a 119 percent increase in the number 
of contracting actions and a 223 percent i ncrease in the total 
dollar value of T & M contracts issued in DON for the period 
1984 to 1992. Federally, T & M contracting actions and 
dollars spent have increased 22 percent and 26 percent, 
respectively, between 1990 and 1992 [Ref. 1:p.322l [Ref. 13]. 
This enormous increase in T & M contract use is 
not consistent with a "reluctance" to award T 5< M contracts, 
but in the researcher's opinion, is more likely due to the 
many advantages of T & M contracting. These advantages 
i nclude: ease of pre-award administration and award; ease of 
budgeting; flexibility to meet customer needs; and the 
financial advantage for the Government during periods of 
inflation. These advantages will be discussed further in 
Chapter IV. 
The data in Table :;:r also show a s light downward 
trend in Navy T & M contracting actions (beginning in 1991) 
and total dollar value (b eg i nning in 1992). Annualizing the 
five month figures for 1994 would correspond to a projected 
3,247 contracting actions and $745,731,247 in T & M dol lar 
value for 1994, the l owest figures in over five years. This 
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sl ight downward trend, beginning in 1991, appears to 
corre s pond wi th a conunent made by one DON contracting of fi cer 
who stated that the Secretary of the Navy ~ssued g u ida nce 
during this period to limit the use of T & M contracts due to 
their proliferation between 1984 and 1991 [Ref. 22 J . As 
i l lustrated i:1 Table II, there was a 208 percent inc rease in 
dollars allocated under T & M contracts during this p e rio d. 
b. Contractor Reluctance to Accept T &- M Contracts. 
The traditional view of the Government is that the 
cont rac tor prefers T & M contracts since they are incentiv ized 
not to control material or labor costs [Ref. 21: p . 1] . 
Conunent s from a] 1 the Government buying activities h owever, 
revealed a distinct financial disadvantage to contractors when 
usin g T & M contracts during inf lationary periods. This 
d i s adv ant.age was also confirmed ir. a discussion with an 
ind us t r y contract negotiator who indicated a reluctance to 
accep t T & M contracts during actual or anticipated periods of 
inflation [Re f. 23J. 
The fixed-labor rate negotiated in a T & M 
can be a heavy financial burden during peri ods o f 
ri s i ng price s. It forces the contractor into being reimburs e d 
onl y for the lower, negot.:iated fixed-labor rat.e, regardless of 
h ow his labor cos ts and overhead may increase during the term 
of the contract. This problem is exacerbated when the T & M 
contract is combined wi th a base year plus option years IDTC. 
Because options are always exercised in favor of the 
Government, the Government can place a heavy financial burden 
on a contractor by exercising an option, further locking the 
into an untenable fixed - labor rate. The 
contractor , therefore, generally prefers cost. reimbursable 
contracts over T & M contracts since labor rates are not 
f ixed . [Ref. 23J 
F. SUMMARY 
Chapter III has presented a comprehensive picture of 
T & M contract usage and applications to serve as a basis for 
understanding the potenc ial problems of this contracting 
method. The chapter began with a review of the narrow scope 
of T & M applications outlined in the available literature. 
The scope was broadened by examining the Navy PMRS to 
determine the various categories of supplies or services 
obtained within DON using T & M contracts. The scope was 
fur ther broadened by conducting personal interviews wi th 
various DOD buying activities to gain valuable insight not 
available from the more impersonal literature and statistics . 
The d i fferences in usage in terms of range and depth, between 
the applications referred to in the literature and those 
reported by DOD buying acti vi ties, were then analyzed. 
Finally, an examination of patterns and trends in T & M 
contract usage was conducted to provide insight into the 
potential problems that may be encountered when using the 
T & M pricing arrangement. 
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Chapter IV will discuss the common difficulties 
e x perie nced with T & M contracts during pre and post award . 
The chapter wi l l a l so e xamine and analyze the characteristics 
which lead to these difficulties. 
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DIFFIctrLTIES WITH TIME AND MATERIALS CONTRACTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will p rovide a thorough background and 
analysis of the difficulties that are associated with T & M 
contracts. The discussion will begin with an examination of 
the characteristics of T & M contracts which can contr ibute or 
lead to difficulties. This is followed by separate 
presentations of difficulties actually encountered during the 
pre-award and post award phases of the T & M contract. 
Finally, an analys is of the difficulties will be conducted. 
An analysis of T & M contract difficulties is essential to 
properly formulate a management guide for use dur i ng the pre 
and post award phases to mitigate potential problems. Only by 
thoroughly understanding the potential difficulties of the 
T & M contract can a contracting officer effectivel y learn 
from the mistakes of the past and institute adequate controls 
for preventing their recurrence. Chapters V and VI 
respe ctively, wil l use the infonnation presented in this 
chapter to propose management guides to reference for properly 
forming and monitoring T &. M contracts during the pre and post 
award phases. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS WHICH LEAD TO DIFFICULTIES 
The T & M contract possesses several cha::-acteristics wh i ch 
c ont r ibute to potential difficulties. Some of these fea tures 
are unique t o the T & M contract and some, al thoug h not u nique 
to T & M contracts bUL present in other cost reimbursable t ype 
contracts, are such predominant occurrences in t he T & M 
c ontract to be considered inherent difficulties. 
Th ere are in essence five princi.pal characteristics of 
T & M contracts which when combined, can breed a host of. 
p otential difficulties. The first three characteristics 
described below are unique to the T & M contract. The 
remaining two can be a ssociated with both T & M cont rac ts and 
cost re i mburs abl e t y pe contracts. The remainder o f this 
sect i o n wil l describe these five characteristics. 
1 . Fixed Profit Percentage Built Into Fixed-Labor Ra te 
Creates Opportunity for Increased Costs Leading to 
Increased Profits 
The most obvious characteristic of the T & M contract 
which can lead to difficulties is the fact that a fixed prof it 
percentage is built i n to the negotiated fixed- l abor rate. 
Al though the labor rate is fixed, the quant i ty of labor is 
highly var iable during contract perfor.nance, creating an 
opportuni t y for the contractor to increase his profit by 
simply increasing the quantity of labor used. A simple 
example is provided in Figure 5 to illustrate . 
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Increased Labor Quantity 
creates Increased Profit 
A contractor is hired to repair a malfunctioning ship" 
board magnetic compass since Ship's force was unable 
to af fect repairs. Both parties agreed to a T & M 
contract since the extent of required repairs was 
unknown. The agreed on fixed-labor rate of $30.00 per 
hour included overhead, G & A, and a 10 percent profit. 
The job should have taken three hours however, the 
inefficient repairman took eight hours to accomplish 
the work. A ceiling is placed at B hours. A 
comparison of costs follows: 
Fixed-Labor Rate 
Materials 
Total Cost to Govt. 
Profit to Contractor 
Contractor 
Finishes 












Figure 5. Example of Increased Labor ,n Increased Profit 
Source: Developed by Researcher 
The simple example in Figure 5 illustrates the 
disincentive for a contractor to complete a job on time or 
early, since his profit clearly increases as the labor 
quantity increases. The contractor is incentivized to finish 
as close to the ceiling as possible or even to attempt 
increasing the ceil ing. 
2. Fixed Elements of Overhead and G &c A Built into Fixed-
Labor R.ate Creates Opportunity for Higher R.ealized 
Final Profit Percentage 
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A more subtle characteristic of the T & M contract , 
which contributes to difficulties, is that other f i xed 
e l ements, besides profit, are built into tr.e negotiated fi x e d-
l abor r a t e prompting a :inal profit percentage greater t han 
wha t was originally contemplated by the contractor, as l abe r 
quan t ity increases. 
A contractor uses a form of unit costing to determine 
a fixed· labor rate for a T & M contract [Ref. 2 4:p . N1 3·N:t7 J. 
The fixed-labor rate is co:nposed of di r ect, indirect, a n d 
G & A c o s t s, as well as profit. Direct costs are clearly 
identif i e d to a contract (e.g. labor cost) and are general ly 
t he basi s i n which overheo.d is allocated. Indirect cost. s 
(i. e. overhead) are those fixed and var i able costs whi ch 
c a n not. be i dentified to the specific contract (e.g. Fixed: 
rent, insurance, property taxes, depreciation, etc.; Variable: 
s upervisory and support labor, i ndi reet suppl iea, fringe 
benef its, et c .). General and Admin i strative (G & A) costs are 
also fi xed and variable costs which cannot be ident i f i ed to 
the spec if ic contract and not identifiable to the o perational 
aspect o f the business (e.g. Fixed: office and statt 
salaries, e tc.; Variable : custodial services, headqc;arters 
payroll, etc.). The overhead and G & A rates, and a desired 
profit percentage, are all established before the start of the 
accounting period and contract award. [Ref. 20:p.2751 
The negotiated f i xed-labor rate t herefore, is 
p ar tial l y composed of fixed overhead and G & A cost elements. 
Once the fixed cost elements are covered, that portion of the 
negotiated labor r ate attributable to fixed overhead and 
G & A expenses becomes additional profit for each additional 
hour expended. This is on top of the separate profit 
percentage built into the negotiated fixed - labor rate. This 
concept is called overabsorbed overhead and is graphically 
illustrates in Figure 6. 
Overabsorbed overhead takes place in T & M contracts 
when labor hours are increased beyond what i s actually 
necessary to complete the Government requirement. The fixed 
total of overhead expenses must be assigned over the total 
volume of business activity (in the form of labor hours) so 
that for example, if volume (in the form of labor hours) is 
doubled, the per-unit cost for fixed expenses (fixed portion 
of overhead) will be cut in half. In other words, in the case 
of a T & M contract, if the tota l number of labor hours is 
increased beyond what the initial overhead rate was based on 
(for example from using more hours than necessary to complete 
a job), the realized ending overhead rate would be lower than 
what was built into the fixed-labor rate, causing the 
contractor to be reimbursed for more overhead than was 
necessary to complete the job. The ~extra" overhead turns 
into profit . The greater the proportion of fixed expenses in 
total overhead, the greater will be the fluctuation in per-
uni t overhead charges because of changes in production volume 
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... A point wi ll occur when 
al l fixed costs will b e 
covered ; from then on, 
al l fixed e l ements com-
bined contribute to 
additional profit. 
ACT UAL FINAL 
OUTCO M E 
Figure 6. Effect of Overabsorbed Overhead 
Source: Devel oped by Researcher 
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As illustrated in Figure 6, an addi t ional profit 
incentive is created as labor quanti t y increases above the 
negotiated amoun t and beyond the point where fixed costs are 
covered. This creates an even stronger incent i ve, than 
illustrated in Figure 5, for the contractor to exper.d 
additional hours to earn additional profit. 
The overabsorbed overhead phenomena is exacerbated 
when the ceiling price is increased. When the ceiling price 
increases, but the fixed· labor rate remains unchanged, the 
contractor will recover more overhead costs than warranted 
because the contract period remains unchanged and amount of 
actual overhead incurred does not increase in proportion to 
increases in the ceiling price. Thus the contractor realizes 
addit i onal profit. [Ref. 3 :p.21J 
Al though the results of the first twa characteristics 
are similar to the results of the illegal Cost· Plus-
Percentage-of-Cost contracts, the Comptroller General has 
upheld the legality of T & M contracts as l ang as no ather 
contract type is suitabl e (and documented with a D & F) and a 
dol l ar ceiling is fixed in advance [Ref. 25:p.264 ] . 
3. Simplicity of T & M Contract Encourages Proliferation 
Incorporating a T & M pricing mechanism into an IDTC 
is a very simplistic means of obtaining needed supp l ies or 
services since there are only four primary elements to 
ascertain up-front to negotiate the contract: anticipated 
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labor categories required for future needs; ful ly burdened 
fixed- Jabor rates for the various labor categories; an 
estimated cost of materials; and a ceiling price. Once the 
D 6< F is completed and the initial TDTC is in place, delivery 
orders can be q u.i c kl y prepared by requiring activities to meet 
a mul titude of possible needs, as outlined in Chapter III. 
This simplicity however, can be a virtue or a vice depend ing 
on where you sit. 
From the Goverrunent'g perspective, this simplicity 
c reat.es several advantages to using T & M contracts which, i n 
t h e researcher's opinion, contribute to increased '1' & M 
contra c t use and corresponding difficulties. The features 
whic:') highlight the T &- M contract's simplicity foll ow: 
EaBe of Award 
Requiring a c tivities prize T & M IDTe s since 
Procurement Admin is trative Lead Time {PALT} is less, allowing 
for work to get started sooner [Ref. 26]. Because the labor 
rate is fixed and negotiated in advance, the only real 
negotiating point for delivery orders is the labor mix {e .g . 
the type{s} of technician required} and the estimated number 
at hours and materials to establish a cei l ing pric e . 
Additionally, DCAA involvement is not necessary for awardin g 
d e live ry orders against the TDTC. [Ref. 26] 
b. EaBe of Budgeting 
The T & M contract also allows for more simplified 
b udget ing for requiring activities [Ret. 26J. Unlike a c ost 
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reimbursable contract, but similar to a fixed-price contract, 
the fixed-labor rates and ceiling price allow the actual costs 
of the Government requirement to be known up-front (unless the 
ceiling price is increased) . On the other hand, the final 
costs in a cost reimbursable contract may not be known wi th 
certainty for months after the work is complete, making 
budgeting extremely difficult. This feature became especially 
beneficial after September 3D, 1993, when the successor "M" 
account was abolished by Public Law 101-510. After this date, 
any over-obligations from previous years will now come out of 
current p eriod funding, making it extremely important to know 
the exact costs of contracts as early as possible. [Ref. 
24:p.A-14] 
Awarding a T & M contract at the end of the fiscal 
year, rather than a cost reimbursable contract which takes 
longer to award, can also help to quickly obligate funds to 
meet obligation goals. Finally, the ability to i ncrementally 
fund a T & M contract (unlike a fixed-price contract) provides 
flexibility to get the contractor started on the requirement 
whi le wa i ting for additional funds. [Ref. 26] 
Fewer Modifications 
The Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) also 
appreciates the T & M contract since fewer modifications often 
result \Ref. 6:p.731 . A contractor is likely to request 
modifications fixed-price contract 
d ifficulties come up to reduce his risk, since each additional 
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dollar in costs represents a corresponding dollar loss in 
pro fits. The contractor is l ess l ikely to request 
modificat.ions as unplanned events are encountered under a 
T & M cont rac t uecause he is reimbursed for his additional 
:"'lours and l:1at.erials unti l the ceiling price is reached, 
[Ref. 2fi] 
4 . Levera ge Effect of a Ceiling Price 
I n both term and completion type contracts, a 
[,imitation of Cost clause can operate to relieve the 
con t r actor from its full b u rden of performance [Ret. 6 : p.fi9 ). 
A Limitation of Cost c l ause is required in fully' funde d c ost 
reimbursement contracts, except those i n volving fa c i l i t i es 
[Ref. 5:part 52 .232 -2 0 ] . Under this c l ause, the Government is 
not obligated to re i mburse the contractor in excess of t h e 
estimated cost set torth in the contract and convers e l y , the 
contractor is not obligated to continue performance under the 
contract or to incur costs in excess of the estimate d c OSts 
set for-th in the schedule, unless and until the contrac tin g 
off i cer ha s notified the contractor in writing that the 
ceiling pri ce has been increased lRef.5:part 52 .2 32·20 ] . The 
simpl i c i t y in theory of the :,imitation of Cost clause howev er, 
often gives way to gr-eat difficulty dur-ing cont r act 
pe r formance since partially completed work can be used as 
leverage to compel t h e Government to provide additional 
funding tor completion of the requirement. Furthermore, thi s 
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underlying concept is also inherent when applying ceiling 
prices in T & M contracts. 
Although the FAR provision and clause matrix does not 
prescribe the use of the Limitation of Cost clause in T & M 
contracts, the adverse leverage effects of this clause are 
also intrinsic in the required ceiling price of l' & M 
contracts [Ref . 5: subpart 52. 3J. The r equired ceiling price 
can act to provide leverage to the contractor if the ceiling 
price is reached before the work is complete and the ceiling 
price is not viewed as "binding" [Ref. 26J. For example, in 
the case of maintenance or repair work when the equipment is 
disassembled and the ceiling price has been reached, the 
Government may be compelled to increase the ceil ing price in 
order to complete the work and return the equipment to 
operational status. Although the Government could potentially 
award a new contract to a different contractor to complete the 
repairs, time constraints generally necessitate a quick 
modification on the original contract to merely increase the 
ceiling price rather than take the additional time to initiate 
a reprocurement or resort to potential litigation in enforcing 
the ceiling price as binding. [Ref. 26] 
It should be pointed out however that, it is possible 
for the Government to overcome the necessity to fund overruns 
by including ceiling prices in the contract [Ref. 6:p.125J. 
Numerous problems in determining their legal effect may be 
encountered however. One major problem is determining whether 
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t h e c e i l ing operates to deny the contractor's right to stop 
work when the ceiling is reached (i.e. the binding ability of 
the ceiling). Another concerns the interrelationship of the 
ceiling with other contract provisions. [Ref. 6:p.125) 
A p r ecisely drdfted ceiling wil l operate to b o th 
dep!: ive the c ontractor of additional funding and require him 
to complete performance within the stipulated amount [Ref. 
6:p.126 ] . In LSI Service Corp. v. United States (1970; t h e 
court found t he inclusion of a separate cost limitation 
article ( i .e. a ceiling price) in a contract converted what 
wou ld have been a cost-plus contract into a limited price 
contract [Ref. 27]. In this case, the entire agreement wa s 
contai ned in a written contract headed "Cost Reimbursement 
Contrac t ,· which provided for an estimated cost of $57,210 a nd 
a f i xed fee of $4,005 . The two relevant articles of the 
cont r a c t are provided below. 
Articl e 2 2 : Article 22 stated if the contractor had 
reason t o believe that the total cost of the contract 
wou ld be substantially greater or less than the estimated 
cost, he would submit a written estimate to t he 
c o nt.rac ti ng officer. Thereupon, the contracting off i cer 
wou l d decide whether to allow any excess costs and then 
n o tify t he contractor of that decision in writing. 
[Re f. 2 7 J 
The inclusion of such an article would normally ma Ke 
the contracL a cost reimbursement contract, which by i ts 
nature does not specifically limit costs however, the contract 
also c o ntained the following: 
Article 17: Cost Limitation. Notwithstanding, the Terms 
a nd Co ndit ions of Ar ticle 22 entitled "Limitation of Cost" 
of the General Provisions, the contractor agrees to 
faithfully and diligently pursue and complete the wor k: 
specified in this proposal SP 9-67-1A at a maximum total 
cost, including fee of $61,215." [Ref. 27! 
The Board of Contract Appeals and the Court held that 
Article 17 converted what would have been a cost-plus contract 
into a limited price contract, requiring the contractor to 
complete the contract at a total cost not to exceed $61,215. 
Article 17 stated that no t withstanding the payment provisions 
of Article 22, the cost limit stated in Article 17 was to 
prevail. Even the heading of the contract is not sufficient 
to change the nature and legal import of the provisions of the 
contract itself. [Ref. 6:p.126) 
The Court of Claims view however, is that such 
ceilings will be strictly construed against the Government, in 
the event of ambiguities in contract language (i .e. contra 
proferentum), making it essential for the Government to 
exercise careful draftsmanship in preparing such provisions 
[Ref. 28J. Because of this, it is highly recommended that 
contracting officers consult with their legal staffs prior to 
implementing potentially conflicting contract clauses and 
articles to discern if the ceiling price will be truly 
binding. 
5. Material Reimbursed At Coet Creates No Incentive for 
Efficient Material Management 
As stated in Chapter II, material 1s reimbursed at 
original cost plus appropriate material handling costs. The 
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fact the Government will reimburse the contractor for all 
material used creates no incentive tor the contractor- t o s ee k 
economies or efficiencies in material management. 
C . DIFF I CULTIES ENCOUNTERED - PRE-AWARD 
This section will present difficu l ties encountered with 
t h e use of T & M contracts during the pre-award phase while 
the nex t section will present post award difficulties. 
Alt h o ugh some of the difficulties may fall into the gray area 
b etween, or witr-in both, pre and post award, every attempt has 
been made to present difficUlties in their more corranon 
associated phase of award. Addi tionally, often what ha ppens 
du ring pre -award wil l contribute to post award d ifficulties, 
fur t he r confusing the distinction. The net result however, 
will be to cover the full realm of potential diffic.ulties, 
even if arguments could be made for placing them into 
differe nt phases. 
The daLa are gathered from a combination of personal 
interviews wi th various DOD contracting activities and a 
literature review. The literature review is primarily 
centered around t h r ee audit reports of T & M contracting 
activ i ty under the Air Force Logistics Command during the 
1 9808 and early 19908. 
The first is Auditor General of the Air Force, AudiL 
Report 7076413, whi ch reviewed 56 T & M contracts awarded 
be t ween J anuary 1982 and November 1987 [Ref. 21 J . The second 
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is Auditor General of the Air Force, Follow - up Audit Report 
9076415, which reviewed 18 contracts issued during the period 
October 1988 to October 1989 to ascertain compliance with the 
findings outlined i n Aud i t Report 70 7 6413 [Ref. 3]. The third 
i s the Office of the DOD Inspector Genera l , Audit Report 93 -
0 23 which responded to a request from the House Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, to investigate allegat i ons of abuse on sole source 
contract F33600-86-0-0295 to install and maintain secure 
communications switches IRed Switches) for fiscal years 1985 
through 1991 [Ref. 29J. 
The data in these audit reports are not considered to be 
unique to the Air Force. Instead, it is the researcher's 
conclusion, based on similar problems reported in personal 
i nterviews, that the difficulties encountered 
representative of probl ems that could be encountered by any 
contracting activity. The remainder of this section will 
discuss the pre - award diffiCUlties reported in the literature 
and personal interviews. 
1. Award of T 6r. M Contracts Despite Availability of 
Historical Cost Data for Award of Other Contract Types 
As stated in Chapter II, the FAR requires that once 
historical data are available, contracting officers should 
avoid continued use of T & M contracts and negotiate fixed 
price contracts since less uncertainty is present. This 
includes the initial award of T & M contracts as well as the 
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exercising of option years. Audit Report 7 076 413 , 11 
(valued at $14.1 million ) of 56 T & M contracts were awarded 
as T & M contracts when available information indicated a 
fixed-price contrac t was more appropriate [Ref. 21 : p . 3 J . 
Fo l low - up Audit Report 9076415, again revealed 13 (valued at 
$2 1 7.2 million) of 18 (valued at. $251.4 mi llion) cont.racts 
were a warded as T & M contracts when a firm fixed-pri ce 
contractual action was more appropriate [Ref. 3:p.4 ] . The 
following are specific examples acquired from these two a u di t 
reports. 
• Cont rac t F33601 B8 - 0 - 0003. Thi s contract was a T & M rOTC 
contract for Select Technical Services for one base y ear 
and 4 option years. The contracting officer had awarded 
previous contracts to the same contractor in 1985 and 19 86 
f o r essentially the same type of engineering servic.es . 
The s tatement o f work included r ou t ine preventive 
ma in t e nance tasks and required the contractor to keep a 
reco r d of services performed and parts used. In total, 
the contracting officer had three years of historical data 
a vailable to negotiate a fixed-price contract . 
Documentation in the contract file indicated the 
contracting officer awarded the contract as a T & M 
because the previous contracts were awarded that way. 
• Con tract F4 1608·87 - D-0106. The contracting office r 
exercised the first year option on this T & M c ontrac t 
without evaluating the four years of historica l cost 
p e r fo rman c e data available. Additionally, the contractor 
had over 11 years of experience performing the same 
services at the same Government facility. Oocu~entat ion 
in t he c o ntract file erroneously stated there was no 
prev ious procurement for the type of work specif i ed unde r 
this contract. 
• Contract F34601·88 · D-0143. The contracting officer issued 
a delivery orde r as a T & M even though two previous 
orders were issued with identical statements of work over 
a t wo year period. 
• Contract F41.608-87-D-000l_ The contracting officer 
awarded a T & M contract for repairing nuclear remote 
interface units, even though three previous T & M 
contracts had been awarded to the same contractor for the 
same requirements_ Further, the contract file was not 
documented to explain why the historical data was not 
used_ 
2. Improper Evaluati on of T &: M Options 
The FAR requires that contracting officers only 
exercise options after determining that it is the most 
advantageous method of fulfilling the Government need, and 
document the fact in the contract fi le [Ref_ 5 : part 17 .2 07] . 
In 15 of the 18 T & M contracts reviewed in Audit 
Report 907641.5, contracting officers took the path of least 
resistance and exercised options wi t hout performing analysiS 
to determine whether exercising the option was the best method 
to meet the Government' s needs, nor did they document their 
rationale in the contract file . Without this rationale, the 
option becomes, in essence, a follow- on sale source contract 
that may not provide the best price for the Government . In 
the aUditor ' s opinion, the contractor is even less likely to 
control costs if t he contracting officer routinely exercises 
annual options wi thout any analysis to determine whether the 
option is the best approach. [Ref. 3 :p. 16] 
3. Determination and Findings (D &. FJ Not Prepared or 
Reviewed as Required 
As stated in Chapter II, a D & F is required to 
just ify the use of a T & M contract over a fixed-price 
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c ont rac t. Once approved by higher authority, it becomes a 
p ermanent part of the contract file. 
A D & F wa s either not prepared, or not prepared 
properly, in all 24 problem T & M contracts cited in number 
one above . Additionally, no D & F was prepared for the T Ii< M 
line i tems on the Red Switch contract audited in Audit Report 
93 - 023 . Thus, no justifica tion was available to support why 
available historical data were not considered faT award of a 
fixed - price contract. Contract i ng officers were reluc t ant to 
taKe additional tirr.e to review historical records and data 
because they had not established any systematic rr.ethod t o 
record and track cost data on previous contracts. Furt her, 
the audit reports found that management and supervisory 
personnel did not enforce the requirement that contracting 
officers evaluate pr::'or historical data. [Ref. 3:p.4] 
4 _ Improper Forwarding of T Ii< M Contract Copies 
The DFARS requires routing of a copy of T 
contracts to the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) 
headquar ters and field audit offices, to proper 
surveil lance [Ref. 12:part 204.201e(il (E}1. Audit Report 
7076413 noted 4 1 of 56 T & M contracts were not sent to DCAA 
for surveillance [Ref. 21:p.3]. The reasons f or not 
submitting the required copies included; being unaware of the 
routing requirement, reliance on someone else to forward the 
c opies, and not seeing a need to forward a copy to OCM . 
5. Application of Improper Profit Percentages 
The contract profit objective developed by the 
Government before negotiations is normally developed based on 
weighted guidelines [Ref. 12:part 215.9l. The DFARS 
guidelines allow contracting officers to increase or decrease 
the profit percentage (within prescribed ranges) depending on 
the degree of cost risk accepted by the contractor. Secause 
the T & M contract has minimum contractor cost risk, it is to 
be considered as a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contrac t for 
establishing a profit weight , which has a normal value of 0.5 
percent and a designated range of 0 to 1 percent. [Ref. 
12:part 215.971-3] 
Aud i t Report 7076413 found 11 of 28 T & M contracts 
reviewed used overstated cost risk percentages to compute 
contractor profit in the pre - negotiation object i ve [Ref. 
21:p.16]. This occurred because contracting officers were not 
adhering to the DFARS gui delines. Further, they did not 
document their rationale for the percentages used in the 
files, nor did supervisory officials challenge 
question the propriety of the calculations. 
6. Failure to Include Required Ceiling Price 
As stated in Chapter II, a ceiling price is required 
on al l T & M contracts t.o limit and safeguard the interests of 
the Government. Audit Report 93-023 stated the Red Switch 
contract did not include a ceiling price, which was part.ially 
respons ible for the growth in the contract price from an 
initial planned program cast and award of $12 . 6 million in 
fiscal year 1986 to $122.4 million through fiscal year 1991, 
increase ot 871 percent . [Ref. 29 :p.7 ] 
Improper Estima t es on T &: M. ID-RC Contribute to Higber 
Contractor Overhead 
Thi s difficu l ty directly affects the contractor and 
indirectly affects the Government. As an example, the 
contractor may have initially bid a fixed -labor rate in good 
faith, based on a Government requirement estimate ot 100,000 
labor hours for a proposed T & M ID -Re. Downsizing however, 
may have reduced the Government 's actual requirements to 
10,000 hours. The c o nt ractor loses substantially because h is 
fixed - labor rate bid estimate was based on spreading h i s 
overhead over ten times as many labor hours as the actua l 
a..'llount reali zed (i.e. he is paid a lower labor rate than his 
actual rea l i zed costs due t o the higher overhead). Th e 
Government can also lose from a reduction in competition 
either from bankruptcies or from a general reluctance by 
contractors t o enter into ID-RC type contracts. This simp le 
example illus t rates how an excessive Government requirement 
est i mate s everely diminishes the contractor's G & A and 
ove r head base, potentially compelling the contractor to seek 
effi ciencies that may not be in the best interests of the 
Gove rnment. 
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8. Unavailability of Lower Priced Labor Categories 
A Government solicitation for an ID -RC will have 
estimates for the approximate number of hours required for 
each of the different l abor categories. Situations were 
reported where, allegedly, the contractor knowingly bid lower 
hourly rates for labor categories with high estimated hour 
requirements and higher labor rates for labor categories with 
low estimated hour requirements in order to come in with the 
lowest overall bid and thereby win the contract. However, 
when the Government started issuing delivery orders against 
the IDTC, the lower priced labor categories were "not 
available" forcing the Government to use the higher priced 
labor categories. [Ref. 22J 
9. Contractor Buy-ins 
A "buy -in" is not unique to a T & M contract but is 
possible in any type of c ontract. A "buy-in" occurs in a 
T & M contract when one contractor intentionally bids a fixed· 
labor rate to the Government which does not include all of his 
costs of doing business, in order to win the contract over a 
competing bidder/offeror (i.e. unfairly eliminating 
competition). The two strongest indicators of a "buy - in" are 
when one contractor's bid or proposal is substantial ly lower 
than the next lowest competitor, or if a review of cost or 
pricing data reveals a proposal well below the contractor's 
actual costs. The danger of a "buy-in" occurs after award, 
when the contractor relies on mendacious post award actions to 
"rec ou p " his loss. A "buy-in" could result ir.. the contractor 
inflat ing his hou r s beyond what is actually necessary to 
complete the contract requirement or the con t ractor insisting 
on us ing l a bor categor i es with higher negotiated fixed-labor 
r a tes f o r contract performance. [Ref. 22J 
D. DI FF ICULTIES ENCOUNTERED - POST AWARD 
This section will present difficulties encountered during 
the post award phase of T & M contrac t s . The majority of this 
information was obtained through persona l interviews with 
various DOD contracting activities . 
1. Incentive to Inflate Labor Hours 
Whether the opportuni ty is exercised or not , the 
temptation is a l ways present in a T & M contract for the 
contractor to use more hours than necessary to complete a t ask 
[Ref. 3 0 :p.28 ] . This problem was universa l among everyone 
i nterviewed with the d i fficulty decreasing directly with the 
level of competition present. The more competition present , 
the more like l y the contractor was to be efficient in t h e 
performance of the T & M contract. 
2 . Ceil ing Often Accomplishes Little on T .. M Contracts 
As stated earlier in Section B of th i s chapter, the 
ceiling price can operate to provide leverage to the 
contractor i f the ceiling price is reached before the work: i s 
c omplete. Several personal interviews stated that buying 
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activities oEten Eeel compelled to take the path oE least 
resistance, to meet mandatory schedules imposed on them, by 
executing quick modiEications to increase the ceiling price, 
rather than take the added time to do reprocurements. The 
contractor's leverage is even greater under a sale source 
T & M contract due to the lack oE competition. 
3. Use of Lower Skilled Workers 
The fixed~labor rate on a T & M contract is a 
composite rate made-up of low skilled workers (at a low wage 
rate) and high skilled workers (at a high wage rate). Because 
the contractor is reimbur sed at a fixed-labor rate, there is 
no incentive for the contractor to send his most skilled 
personnel since their wages are likely to be close to the 
negotiated fixed· labor rate. The contractor will benefit in 
two ways by using lower skilled personnel. First, he will 
earn more profit because his actual labor costs will be less 
using the lower skilled/lower paid employees. Second, he will 
also benefit with increased profit if the lower skilled worker 
takes l onger to complete the job than a higher skilled worker 
illustrated in Figure 5 . 
4. Use of T & M Contract as Vehicle for Training New 
Personnel at Government's Expense 
This problem is similar to the difficulty cited in 
number three above. Because the contractor is reimbursed a 
negotiated fixed-labor rate, it is to his advantage to take 
this opportunity to send new people or trainees to perform the 
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work s ir..ce t heir wage rates are likely well below the 
negotiated fi x ed - labor rate, thereby increasing hi s realized 
p ro f i t. In addition to the benefits to the contractor ci ted 
above, the Govermnent loses in t wo ways . First, the l owe r 
s killed trainees would l ikely also contribute to higher 
F.laterial scrap rates thereby increasing material costs unde r 
a l' & :vi contract. Second, the Government is effectively 
subsidizing the contractor's training program by allowing 
trainees to "practice" on the Government contract. 
S . Use of T & M Contract as Vehicle for Ordering Non-
Related Equipment 
This problem was not associated with contractor a b use 
but wi t h abuse by the Government requiring activities 
t hemselves. 'The T & M contract line item for materia l s is 
sometimes used by the Government as an easier means o f 
obtaining non- related equipment and materials than properly 
initiating a separate contracting action. This type of abuse 
is most prevalent in highly decentralized l' & M IDTC 
contracts, where many separate acti v i ties have orde r ing 
authority under t he IDTC . It is also more common when the 
statements of wo rk are not speci fically and clearly wri t ten. 
[Ref. 29:p . 80 J 
The most notorious abuse noted was reported in Audit 
Re port 93-023. Under the T & M contract under review for the 
i ns ta l lation of secure communications (Red Switch) equipment, 
the following t ypes of non related materials were obtained 
under the category "miscellaneous installation parts and 
material s:" research and development; purchase of golf 
shirts; building of a kitchen and general's balcony; and 
purchase of computers and multiple copies of Wordperfect and 
Lotus software. [Ref. 29:p.39] 
6. Problems Associated With Over-and-Above Concept 
There were two primary problems reported when the 
Over-and-Above concept was used in a T & M contract; one noted 
by the Government and one noted by a contractor. 
Incremental Funding to Obligate Funds 
Unlike a fixed-price contract, the Government can 
incrementally fund a T & M contract [Ref. 26]. This is 
nonnally an advantage to the Government because it could allow 
a contractor to begin work on a requirement (e.g. a R&D 
effort) with the Government funding continuation efforts as 
funds become available. As one buying activity reported, it 
can also create problems if requiring activities use the open 
and inspect line item to "bank" excess funds at the end of the 
fiscal year to meet obligation goals. Although Obligation 
goals may be met, it often creates unObligated balances in 
these contract line items if the funds are never actually 
used. [Ref. 3U 
b. "Stop" Go" Aspects Delay Repairs 
One contractor expressed displeasure with the 
nstop & go" aspects of the Over-and-Above concept because it 
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creates scheduling problems and increases the time to attect 
repairs [Ref. 23 J . After the single negotiation of a normal 
cost reimbursement c on tract, the contractor is free to affecl 
repairs with limited Government intervention. Under a T & M 
contract however, there are several negot iations, and hence, 
delays. 
Under a T & M ID-RC there is one negotiation to 
determine labor cate gories, fixed-labor rates, a ce i l ing 
pric e , and an estimated total quantity of labor required up -
fron t. Then, when a Government requirement randomly comes up , 
the contractor must negotiate again for the delivery order 
(although it's much quicker at this point) to determine t he 
needed labor categories, estimated mater ials, and a cei ling 
price. This also pulls the contractor away from other work , 
creating scheduling problems. Further, when an Over - and - Above 
line item is in place, the contractor again must stop and wait 
for the Government to review, for "reasonableness ," the list 
of additional repairs required and negotiate a new ceiling 
price before he is allowed to continue. In the contractor ' s 
opinion, the turn-on process for T & M contracts with Over -
and-Above line items is s l ower and repairs take longer than 
under a cost reimbursement contr-act. [Ref. 23] 
7. Lack of Perfonnance Fle;ll;ibility 
In a T & M contr-act, unlike a cost reimbur-sement 
contract, there is no flexibility to change labor- categories 
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during contract performance, without a modification, to meet 
the needs of the situation. This can cause delays when a 
needed labor category is not listed in the T & M contract, and 
partially completed and urgent work cannot be completed 
without executing a modification. 
8. Disadvantage of Fixed Labor Rates During Periods of 
Inflation 
As stated in the trend analysis section of Chapter 
III, the contractor stands to lose considerably from being 
locked into fixed-labor rates during periods of inflation, 
especially IDTC contracts with base-plus option years. This 
problem may manifest itself in the contractor building-in 
large profit contingencies at the outset into their negotiated 
fixed-labor rate. It may also partially explain the 
motivation behind other post award problems. 
9. Lack of Resources for Adequate Surveillance 
A few contract adminis tration activities reported 
insufficient personnel resources to adequately monitor lower 
dollar value T & M contracts since they devoted the majority 
of thei r personnel to higher dollar value contracts. These 
contract administration activities felt that the aggregate 
effect of the potential abuses on lower dollar value T & M 
contracts was substantial and warranted closer monitoring if 
assets were available. 
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10 . Growing Contractor' B Personnel System. Change s 
A contractor is likely to change its ~ersunnel system 
as it grows, including pay structures and labor categori e s . 
This creates confusion for both the Govern.!nent and t he 
c oncra c to r when trying to pay invoices on T & M contracts wi th 
fixed labor r a t_es and changing labor categories. 
11. Labor Mischarges 
This final difficulty is not unique to T & M contrac t s 
but is a potential prabl em in any cost reimbursement type of 
Because the labor element of aT&. M contrac t 
comprises such a large percentage of the total dol la r v alue 
however, a d i scussion of the potential prohlems with lab o r 
mischarging is relevant. 
The impact of labor mischarging is almost al ways far 
greater than the basic labor costs, since a sing1e hour o f 
mischarged labor may result in as much as three times the 
labor-hour rate due to indirect cost allowances which 
added based on that hour [Ref. 32:p.lO]. Labor 
highly susceptible to mischarging because employees' labor can 
be readily shifted to any contract with the stroke of a pen on 
their time cards. 'T'he following are examples of difficulties 
with lahor mischarging as gathered from the DOD Office of the 
Inspector General; [Ref. 32; p. 10- J..2] 
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a. Transfer of Labor Cost 
This mischarge is often made to eliminate a loss 
on a fixed-price contract by making journal entries to shif t 
the loss from the fixed-price contract to the T & M contract. 
This problem is more prevalent with contractors engaged i n 
multiple, simul taneous Government contracts. 
b. Time and Charges Do Not Agree with Contractor 
Billing to the GovenllJlellt 
This labor mischarge is easily detected by simply 
totaling the hours expended on t he T & M contract and 
comparing them to the hours bi l led. The primary source 
documents for review are employee time cards, rather than 
computerized labor distributions, since it is fa r easier to 
falsify a computer printout than to corrupt the entire work 
force to falsify time cards. 
Original Time Cards are Destroyed or Hidden 
This is often a strong indicator of impropriety. 
Duplicate time cards shoul d always be rev iewed with suspicion. 
d _ Changes Made to Indi vidual Time Cards 
This mi scharging has been encountered by DCAA in 
reviewing the original contract charge numbers on employee 
time cards [Ref. 32:p.12J. Eac h employee time card should 
have a cross-reference to a specific contract fo r Government 
contracts. Although a few random changes are not indicative 
of mischarging, a preponderance of c orrections, errors, lioe-
outs, etc., c ould indicate mischarging. 
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Time Card Changes Made by Supervi Bors 
Ideally, time cards should be maintained by 
individual employees and reviewed/signed by supervisors . 
Timekeeping systems which have supervisors posting labor 
charges should be reviewed with skepticism . 
B. ANALYSIS OF T &. M CON'1'RACT DIFFI CULTIES 
The analysis section of this chapter will be broken d own 
into three areas. First, the characteristics of T & M 
contracts which lead to difficulties will be analyzed. This 
is fo l lowed by separate analyses of pre-award and post award 
problems. Tables VI through VIII are provided to consolidate 
the findings previously presented and to serve as a ready 
reference for referral during the analysis. 
L Analysis of T " M Characteristics Which L ead to 
Difficulties 
As stated in Chapter II, the traditional view of 
T & M contracts is that there is little or n o incentive f or 
the contractor to control labor and material costs sin c e 
additional hours spent on the contract resul t in increased 
profits to the contractor. This view is indeed supported 
directly in Table VI by characteristics ONE, TWO, and FIVE and 
indirectly by FOUR. 
Characteristics CNE and TWO clearly show a strong 
incentive for the contractor not to contro l labor costs since 
his profit clearly increases as the labor quantity increases 
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on the T & M contract. Although characteristi c FIVE shows no 
incentive to increase material costs, it does not provide any 
incentive to decrease material costs either, or fo r the 
judicious procurement and use of materials . These findings 
provide further evidence of the contractor's lack of incentive 
to control labor costs up to the ceiling. 
TABLE VI 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF CHARACTERISTICS 
WHICH LEAD TO DIFFICULTIES 
CHARACTERISTICS WHICH LEAD TO DIFFICULTIES 
Fixed Profit Percentage Built into Fixed-Labor 
Rate Creates Opportunity for Increased Costs 
Leading to Increased Profits 
Fixed Elements of Overhead and G & A Buil t into 
Fixed· Labor Rate Creates Opportunity for Higher 
Realized Final Profit Percentage 
Simplicity of T & M Contract Encourages 
Proliferation 
Leverage Effect of a Ceiling Price 
Material Reimbursed At Cost Creates No 
Incentive for Efficient Material Management 
Source: Prepared by Researcher 
Characteristic FOUR indirectly supports the 
traditional view . Al though the contractor may 
intentionally use partially-completed work as leverage to 
increase the ceiling price, the data show simplicity often 
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does compel the Government to simpl y increase the c eil i n g 
price with a modification, rather than initiate a time 
consuming reprocurement (or even litigation to confirm the 
ceiling is binding) to finish the work. The knowledge tha t 
the contractor may have a n easier time of getting the ceil ing 
increased, provides l ittle incentive for him to contro l l abo r 
and p revent reaching the ceiling in the first place. 
Characteristic THREE was une xpected at the outset of 
the research and during the initial literature review but 
became more pronounced during personal interviews. The e a r l y 
literature review of governing T & M contract directives and 
regul a t i ons did not allude to the simpl icity aspect o f the 
T & M contract i ng method. The first indication of simplicity 
was note d in the audit reports reviewed . Later, during 
personal interviews, respondents consistently reported the 
adminis t rative and budgeting virtues of this pricing 
mechani s m, particularl y when combined with the IOTC . 
In the researcher's opinion, simplicity is at least 
one ot the c auses for T & M contract proli feration since busy 
contrac t ing officers will naturally gravitate toward methods 
which make t heir jobs easier. Interestingly, upper eChelons 
of the Goverrunent discourage T & M contract use however , the 
closer one gets to where the contracting work is actually 
performed, the more the Goverrunent l ikes this contracting 
method due to its simplic i ty. Simplicity, in and of itself is 
not bad, but in fact, is needed in Goverrunent contrac ting to 
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help streaml ine the acquisition process. Unfortunately, other 
contracting requirements should not come at the detriment of 
simplicity. Any characteristics which contribute to 
simplicity without increasing either the Government's or the 
contractor's share of risk should be exploited, while 
mitigating those characteristics which contribute to risk. 
The existing T & M contract regulations are simple and 
in place to reduce the risk to the Government if they are 
followed. Adherence to existing regulations would serve to 
mitigate the potential negative effects of characteristics 
ONE, TWO, and FIVE. A host of problems can occur however, 
when the regulations are not followed. These difficul ties are 
manifested in the anal ysis of the pre and post award problems 
which follow. 
2. Analysis of Pre-Award Problems 
The virtue of simplicity in T & M contracting is 
misused when regulations are not followed by the Government. 
The first seven of the nine pre-award problems listed in Table 
VII are attributable to errors made by the Government and not 
contractors. This is a significant finding because it 
indicates the Government can control a significant amount of 
T & M contract risk because the locus of the majority of the 
problems during pre-award resides with the Government. Of 
these seven problems, problems ONE through SIX are directly 
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att ributabl e to contracting activity violations of existing 
reg ulations out1 ined in the FAR. 
TABLE VII 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF PROBLEMS 
NOTED DlJRING PRE -AWARD PHASE 
PROBLEMS NOTED DURING PRE-AWARD PHASE 
Award of T & M Contract Despite Availabi lity 
of Historical Data f o r FFP Contracts 
Improper Evaluation of T & M Contract Options 
D & F Not Prepared or Not Prepared Properly 
Improper Forwarding of T & M Contract Copies 
Application of Improper Profit Percentages 
Failure to Include Required CeiliClg Price 
Improper Estimates on ID-RC Contribute to 
Higher Contractor Overhead 
Unavailability of Lower Priced Labor Categories 
Contractor "Buy - ins" 
Source: Prepared by Researcher 
In each personal inte.:::view conducted, the respondents 
c l early articulated the regulations. They were aware of the 
requirements tor reviewing historical data, properl y 
evaluating opo:.ions, preparing Determinat i ons and Findings, 
proper routing, applying proper prof i t percentages , and 
including ceiling prices. The three audit reports however, 
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suggest that these regulations and requirements are nDt always 
followed. It is uncertain why there is a difference between 
what is clearly known by contracting officers and what is 
actually performed. The answer may lie in the regula tions 
themselves being unrealistic or unnecessary to adequately 
mitigate the potential negative effects of T & M contracts. 
This is unlikely though, since following the regulations to 
the letter would eliminate six of the nine pre-award problems 
l isted in Table VIr. Additionally, an important observation 
wa s made in the personal interviews which supports the current 
level of regulations. All contracting offices contacted, 
including the one civilian contractor, believed that existing 
regulations were adequate to control T & M contracts. Not one 
respondent reconunended reducing the current level of 
regulations. This seems to indicate that current regulations 
are adequate if followed. 
One may then speculate and assume that time 
constraints are the motivation for "bending the rules." Time 
and Materials contracts may be the path of least resistance 
for busy contracting officers under pressure to meet mandatory 
schedules imposed on them. For example, it is far easier and 
quicker to exercise a T & M rDTC option, or to award a new 
T & M contract, than to take the added time to properly review 
historical cost information for award of a FFP contract or to 
resolicit. It is even quicker to award if other regulations 
are not followed {e.g. not performing a D & F or establishing 
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a ceil i ng price). Ideally then, if this is the case , 
supervisors must be aware of the problem and balance wo r k 
l oads, etc., whi l e simu l taneously ensuring compliance wi t h 
r egulations. 
Problems EIGHT and NINE are not shortcomings of 
Government contracting activities but of the contrac t ors 
themselves . Only a contractor with a short term outlook or 
one who feels his actions will not be detected would likely 
tak e the risk of lost future business or goodwill. Although 
these problems can result in losses to the Government, mos t 
contractors likely understand the lang term implications of 
these actions on their reputation and opportunity for any 
future Government a wa rds. Accordingly, most contractors will 
not likely take the risk, particularly if the Government 
remains vigi l ant in its monitoring. 
It goes without saying that in a lengthy contracting 
process, the events tha t occur early have an effect en later 
Specifically, mistakes made in the pre-award phase 
will often be manifested in t he post a ward phase. There is a 
dicholomy in having an easy a ward up-front only to have more 
di ff i c ulties later during post a ward. As indicated earlier, 
the sign ificance of the Government's role in the level of 
problems encountered during pre·award demonstrates a key area 
where the Goverl1F.lent should focus to mitigate potential post 
award problems wi th T & M contracts. The final analysis 
s ection will examine the post award difficul t ies. 
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3. Analysis of Post Award Problems 
Whereas the majority of the pre-award problems were 
the responsibility of the Goverrunent, the reverse is true for 
the post award problems sununarized in Table VIII. Problems 
ONE through FOUR, and ELEVEN are clearly the responsibility of 
the contractor. Conversely, only problem FIVE can be 
attributed to the Goverrunent_ The remaining prob l ems are 
either circumstantial, with no fault associated to either 
party (prob lems NINE and TEN) , or inherent to the 
contract and subject to interpretation (problems SIX through 
EIGHT) _ 
Although at first glance, problems ONE through FOUR, 
and ELEVEN would appear to be g laring violations, one must ask 
what the mot i vation might be to engage in these activities, 
beyond the apparent motivation to maximize profits. The 
contractor may have initially acted in good faith to provide 
a realistic fixed-labor rate estimate, but anyone of a number 
of factors outside of the contractor's control could have 
occurred to put the contractor into a loss situation. 
The t wo most dominant factors include an unexpected rise in 
the inflation rate, and/or diminishing defense business which 
increases overhead rates _ Either one of these factors could 
eliminate any profit originally built into the fixed - labor 
rate estimate, and even result in a loss. 
Problem FIVE is indicative of a lack of clarity in the 
statements of work and/or improper supervision. A clear and 
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definitive statement of work wil l prevent unauthorized 
materials procurement by the Government. 
StnOlARY or P INDINGS or PROBLEMS 
NOTED DURI NG POST AWARD PRASE 
PROBLEMS NOTED DURING POST AWARD PHASE 
Incentive to Inflate Labor Hours 
ceiling Price Often Accomplishes Little 
on T & M Contract 
Use of Lower Skilled Workers 
Use of T & M Contract as Vehicle for Training 
New Personne l at Government Expense 
Use of T & M Contract as Vehicle for Ordering 
Non - Related Equipment 
Problems With Over-and-Above Concept 
Lack of Performance Flexibil i ty Due to 
Fixed-Labor Rates 
Disadvantage of Fixed-Labor Rates During 
Periods of Inflation 
Lack of Resources for Adequate Surveillance 
10 Growing Contractor'S Personnel System Changes 
Time Card Fraud 
Source: Prepared by Researcher 
The "stop and go" aspects of problem SIX are a source 
o f concern for contractors. With the contractor preference of 
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starting and completing a requirement with minimal delay, 
interruptions and schedule changes, this may be an area where 
the Government can make modest changes which can benefit both 
parties. 
Problem SEVEN is considered very minor in nature. All 
that is necessary is a contract modification to add any needed 
labor categories to the T & M contract. Although the 
modification is not difficult, it could be avoided altogether 
by ensuring, up-front, that all contingent labor categories 
are included in the initial contract. 
As stated previously, problem EIGHT may actually be an 
important influence or catalyst for problems ONE through FOUR, 
and ELEVEN. The ability to mitigate the effects of inflation 
on a T & M contract could, therefore, be a key motivator to 
encourage a contractor to perform in the most efficient manner 
possible. For this reason, an economic price adjustment 
feature may be warranted. This and other potential motivators 
to encourage efficient performance of T & M contracts will be 
further examined in the remaining chapters. 
F. SmotARY 
Chapter IV has presented a comprehensive view of T 
difficulties including analysis of the 
characteristics and problems associated with their use. The 
chapter began with examination of the general 
characteristics of T & M contracts which lead to difficulties. 
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This wa s f0 1 ] owed hy Reparate discussions of the p r oblems 
encountered during Doth the pre and post award phases of the 
T & M contract. Finally. ar:. analysis of the prob l ems was 
conducted to he l p understClnd the probable reasons for t h e 
diff i cu l ties and to serve as a basis for developing a 
management guide, as a reference during pre and post award, t o 
ass i st in mitigating these potential prob l ems. 
Chapters V and VI will use the information from thi s and 
the preceding chapters to propose management guides for p r oper 
forming and monitoring of T & M contracts during pre and p o s t 
award, r espectively. 
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V. TIME AND MATERIALS CONTRACT PRE-AWARD CONTROLS 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter IV discussed a myriad of potential problems 
associated with T & M contracts during both the pre-award and 
post award phases of the contract. Chapter V will lead off 
where the previous chapter ended, by examining the controls 
whi ch should be implemented to mitigate those pre - award 
problems highlighted in Chapter IV. The controls advocated 
can serve as a management guide to reference during the pre-
award phase for properly structuring and initiating T & M 
contracts to mitigate potential problems. 
This chapter will also include an examination and analysis 
of possible incentives/controls which might be built into the 
T & M contract to incentivize both the Gov ernment and the 
contractor to perform the contract as efficiently as pOSSible. 
The incentives proposed are p rimarily the result of closely 
analyzing the characteristics which contribute to difficulties 
presented in Table VI. 
B. CONTROLS TO PREVENT PRE-AWARD DIFFICULTIES 
This section will refer to the pre -award difficulties 
presented in Chapter IV. The reader will find it useful to 
periodically refer to Table VII since the problems sum .. narized 
in it will be referred to , by number, extensively in this 
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analysis. The objective at this section is to provide a 
management guide to consult during pre-award to mitigate those 
pre··a,.,·ard difficulties presented in Chapter IV. 
The supervisor's role in correcting many of these problems 
cannot be overemphasized. ':'he purpose of Chapter IV was to 
provide awareness to supervisors of these problems. Wi t h 
awareness covered, Chapter V can be used as a management gu i d e 
to help mitigate these problems. A recurring theme throughout 
this section is that contracting officers cannot be afraid t o 
make good business decisions as long as their rationale is 
documented in the contract file. The superv i s or's role is to 
not only ensure that documentation exists, but also to serve 
as quality control for e ff icient contract administrat i on and 
performance. 
A sig nificant finding pointed out in Chapter IV revealed 
that the Government, and not the contractor, was r-esponsible 
tor seven of the nine pre-award difficulties. Six of these 
difficulties were associated with violation ot e xis ting 
regulations. This can be viewed optimistically though , since 
if the Government is responsible for the difficulties, it is 
in a better position to correct them than if the problel'.'ls were 
caused by contractors. The remainder of this sectior. will 
propose controls to the difficulties summarized in Table VII. 
1. Problem ONE - Award of T " M Contract Despite 
Availability of Historical Data for FFP Contracts 
The FAR requires review of any and all historical data 
before awarding a T & M contract [Ref. 5:part 16.l03(c)j. 
This requirement exists to ensure the contracting officer uses 
existing data to l essen the uncertainty of the requirement in 
orde r to award a FFP contract. As a bare minimum, the 
contracting officer must take the added t ime to manually 
review, what are normally, hard-copy files for similar type 
contracting actions. This process i s cumbersome and takes 
time. 
To fully meet this requirement in the most effort l ess 
manner, the contracting officer should have a systematic and 
uncomplicated means of recording and storing a l l prior 
contract data and then a means to quickly retrieve it for 
future use. The recording and storing of pertinent contract 
data is already a ccomp l ished through the required i ndividual 
contract file for each contracting action. I t is the 
retrieval criteria however, whi c h can prevent or hinder rapid 
access to pertinent historical data. 
Retrieval of data could be simplified through the use 
of some type of indexable, computerized data base. Indexing 
is necessary to allow rapid retrieval of contract data. One 
of the more conunon means of retrieving is by a key word/ 
phrase search. For example, a key word/phrase search could 
provide either: 1) specific contract data from past related 
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contr-act actio n s, or more simply, 2) a f i le cross-reference 
number to a l low for rapid manual search of existing contract 
files for related cost information. 
The first option, a computer data base containing all 
pricing data, is likely not feasible for most contracting 
activities due to resource constraints. The time necessary to 
input all the various metries of each past contracting action 
wou ld be great. Further , the sporadic, non - repetitive, and 
uncertain nature of T & M contracts makes the actual 
determination, of the pertinent data to input, extremely 
difficult . 
One contracting activity contacted however, did report 
some attempt at standardizing certain labor jobs to serve as 
a repository of historical data . For example, a time standard 
exists for laying 1000 feet of telephone cable in a three foot 
t:rench in semi-rocky ground, attaching cable ends, checking 
continuity of the circuit, and refilling the trench. The 
difficulty of detennining the relevant data items as well as 
the lime required to input all these parameters is evident i n 
this simple example . [Ref. 33J 
The second option of forming an indexable , 
friendly, cross-reference data base is more feasible and would 
be very helpful to a busy contracting officer attempting to 
quickly locate and review related historical data. In this 
option, the researcher prOposes a much more abbreviated data 
base . The following are suggested data fields t o consider in 
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the data base: contract type; contract number; principal 
product or service ; Federal Supply Cl assification {FSC) group 
and class or Service Code; and a short description of the 
requirement. The actual data fie l ds could be modified to 
reflect the needs of the contracting office. A key word 
dictionary should also be developed to provide discipline to 
ensure basic key descriptive words are used throughout, to 
enable successful searches. 
Through a key word/phrase search such as, "pump, 
reciprocating" or "overhaul, " a contracti!1g officer could 
quickly obtain the con t ract numbers of potential similar 
contracts. The contract number would be the cross-reference 
number to allow pulling the related contract file (s) (which 
are already required for each contracting action) for review. 
Initially, some time wou l d be required to go through past 
contract fi les to construct a data base. Once complete 
however, systematic update of the data base, as c ontracts are 
awarded, would be relatively effortless. 
It may a lso be cost effective to issue a contract for 
development of a computerized historical cost tracking system, 
if in-house assets are insufficient to develop a user friendly 
system. The expertise of an outside contractor could be 
solicited, through a broad func t ional specification of what 
the Governmen t would want the software to do, to encourage 
maximum creat ivity . Contracting headquarter's commands should 
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consider developing these systems if a large number of T &. M 
contrac t s are issued by their reporting activi:=.ics. 
Pr o blem TWO - Improper Evaluation of T &: M Cont r act 
Options 
Arl option provision is a unilateral right in a 
contract whereby. for a specified period of time, the 
Government may elect to purchase additio:1al supplies or 
services called [or by the contract, or extend the term of the 
contract. The FAR allows the Government to exercise options 
only when it is the most advantageous method of fulfilling the 
Government's need, price and other factors considered [Ret. 5: 
part 17.207(c)(3l]. 
Time and Material IOTes of:.",:! have a base year and one 
or morc option years. The base year often provides excellent 
historical data for consideration of a fixed-price contract 
during the option years. Tn all cases, the base year must be 
examined closely to attempt award of a FFP contract over a 
T & M contract whenever possible. There should be few cases 
of awarding options as T & M contracts due to the likely 
availability of historical data from the base year. 
In those few cases where historical data are still 
inSUfficient, the FAR provides great latitude for contracting 
officers to e x ercise good business judgment for exercising 
options, provided their analysis and rationale is justified in 
the contract file. Underlying this business judgment must be 
the objective of full and open competition, whenever possible, 
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to provide reasonable assurance of a fair and reasonable 
pr~ce . Without proper analysis and corresponding 
documentation in the contract file, there is no assurance of 
a fair and reasonable price. 
It is l ikely , the predominant reason contracting 
officers improperly exercise options is a combination of the 
ot exercising options, neglect, and inadequate 
supervision. As in the requirement for reviewing historical 
data, proper evaluation of options takes time which is at a 
premium for busy contracting officers. Personal interviews 
confirmed that exercising options was easier and quicker than 
resoliciting, particularly if proper analysis i s not 
conducted. 
In addition to reviewing historical data from the base 
year. the contracting officer should seek the opinion of the 
Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) before 
making his final dec ision to exercise an option. The COTR's 
recommendation should be given considerable weight considering 
his proximity to the contractor and familiarity wi th the 
events of the base year. 
Supervisors must ensure adequate procedures are in 
place to meet FAR requirements. Performance Management Review 
(PMR) audits should not be relied upon to "catch " the problem. 
Because busy contracting officers sometimes take the path of 
least resistance, supervisors must be vigilant in reviewing 
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contra ct files to ensure evidence of analysis of options 
supports t h e decision to exercise the option. 
3 . Pr oblem THREE - D & F Not Prepared or Not Prepared 
Properly 
This problem is a direct outcome of the fundamental 
proble m ci ted in number one above. In the researcher's 
judgment, it is very difficult to prepare a D & F justifying 
use of a T & M contract if no review of historical or market 
data is conducted, since this review is essential to confirm 
that the un certainty is too great to award a FFP contract. 
If the contracting officer had an easier means of 
reviewing historical data, he/she would be more inclined to do 
the revi ew and thus, have an accurate basis to support a 
D & F. This further supports the recommendation of d eveloping 
and implementing an indexable, computerized, cross-reference 
data base tor rapid retrieval of historical data. 
AS in number two above, supervisors are the primary 
checkpoint to ensure FAR requirements are met. Their 
attentiveness is necessary to mitigate this problem. 
4. Problem FOOR - Improper Forwarding of T & M Contract 
CopieB 
Since awareness was one of the factors cited for not 
adhering to this requirement, the problem is easily eliminated 
by reviewing and following DFARS guidance on the routing of 
T & M contract copies. Supervisors must also establish 
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internal procedures to eliminate confusion on exactly who, 
within the contracting office, is responsible for the routing. 
Prohlem FIVE - Application of Improper Profit 
Percentages 
The essence of this problem is that contracting 
officers did not use DFARS guidance to determine the pre -
negotiation profit objective or document their rationale in 
the contract file, nor did supervisors challenge the propriety 
of the calculations. One can surmize that the cause of this 
problem is a lack of understanding, by contracting officers, 
of the relationship between the pre-negotiation profit 
objective and the final realized profit. 
The DFARS is clear on the range of profit on a T & M 
contract for the pre-negotiation profit objective. It must be 
emphasized that this is only a Goverrunent objective determined 
before conunencing negotiations. Neither the contractor nor 
the Government is obligated to end negotiations at a profit 
less than or equal to the objective. Because profit is a 
motivator of efficient contractor performance, negotiations 
aimed at merely reducing prices by reducing profit are not in 
the best interest of the Goverrunent. In exercising his/her 
best business judgment, there is nothing wrong if the 
negotiator ultimately decides on a higher profit percentage 
than his/her original objective, provided their rationale is 
documented in the contract file. 
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Supervisors are important in mitigating this problem 
since their reaction to negotiation outcomes can have a 
significant impact on the original negotia t ion position of the 
negotiator. A supervisor who fixates only on the difference 
between the pre and post negotiation profit objectives CQuid 
influence a negotiator to establish a higher pre-negotiation 
profit objective in order to reduce the potential difference 
between the pre and post negotiation percentages. Instead, 
the supervisor should balance the overall effect of the final 
negotiated profit percentage against the totality of tradeofts 
made during negotiations. Additionally, supervisors Should 
review the pre - oegot iatioo profi t percentages be fore 
negotiations to ensure calculations comply wi th DFARS 
guidance . 
6. Problem SIX - Failure to Include R.equired Ceiling 
Price 
In the researcher's opinion, one of the Government ' s 
best assurances to prevent unplanned cost growth lies i n 
estab lishing a well-conceived binding ceiling price. As 
stated i n Chapter IV, a precisely drafted ceiling can operate 
to deny the contractor of add it ional funding beyond the 
ceiling whi le requiring him to complete performance with in the 
stipulated amount. However, since the courts have construed 
poorly written or conflicting contract clauses and articles 
against the drafter (i. e. the Government), it is extremel y 
important for contracting officers to have t heir legal staffs 
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review potentially conflicting clauses and ceiling articles to 
ensure the enforceability of a binding ceiling. 
React ions were mixed during interviews when asked how 
often the ceiling price was exceeded. A large number of 
respondents felt compelled to increase the ceiling price 
because the contractor complained of being unable to complete 
the contract because the ceiling was too low for the level of 
uncertainty. Unless it is absolutely clear to the contractor 
that the ceiling is binding, the Government may continue to 
see some contractors requesting increases to the ceiling. For 
this reason, any contracting activity engaged i n T & M 
contracts should make drafting clear and binding ceilings a 
matter of priority. Likewise, once the ceilings truly are 
binding, much more consideration and time must go into 
negotiating them to prevent undue risk on either party. 
On the surface, the benefit of a binding ceiling seems 
obvious. The contractor would be unable to increase labor 
hours (and thereby profit) beyond the ceiling. Unfortunately 
though, i mplementing a binding ceiling which provides a 
contractor low or no profit may not provide proper motivation 
for optimum contract performance. An effective ceiling price 
would have to consider the degree of uncertainty and risk. 
The use of ceilings with potential incentives and controls 
will be further discussed later in the incentives section of 
this chapter. 
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7 . Pr oblem SEVEN - Improper Estimates OD ID-RCa 
Contribu t e t o Higher Contractor Overhead 
AS stated in Chapter IV, improper estimates on T & M 
=D RCs direct:y affect the contractor through higher overhead 
rates, which are not reimbursed by the Gove rnment due to t h e 
negotiated fixed-labor rate nature of the T & M contract. 
a l so indirectly affects the Government through a reluctance of 
c o ntractors to enter into ILl·RCs. The primary contributors to 
this problem are the fact that an ID-RC does not require t he 
Government to indicate a minimum order quantity in t he 
contract nor is the Government obligated to meet their 
estimates. Under FAR guidelines, all that is necessary is [ or 
the Government to provide a realistic estimated t o ta l 
quantity, wh i ch mayor may not be realized. Without a minimum 
quanti t y , the contractor could theoretically receive no orders 
under the contract, drastically affecting his overhead, 
The outcome of receiving minimal or no delivery orders 
can b e detrimental. One contracting activity contacted noted 
cases where contracto rs resorted to litigation in order to 
either get out of multiple year T & M ID-RC contracts, or be 
allowed to readjust their fixed-labor rate, due to drastic 
changes i n overhead caused by inaccurate Government estimates 
[Ref. 34). 
Since the :;;'AR does not specifically prohibit the 
possibility of incorporating a minimum quantity into an ID-RC, 
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consideration may be appr opriate to place a minimum quantity 
in the contract in order to encourage contractors to accept 
this arrangement, particularly in T & M ID-RCs with options 
extending the ordering period. The minimum quantity could be 
the contractor's basis in establishing "worst case" overhead 
and corresponding fixed-labor rates for their 
negotiation position. 
8 , Problem EIGHT - Unavailability of Lower Priced Labor 
Categories 
This problem could be al leviated if the Government 
required that the contractor's proposal conta in very specific 
job descriptions describing the differen t labor categories 
proposed under the rDTC. The Government's statements of work 
(SOW) for each delivery order issued under the IDTC must then 
ensure that if a certain labor category is desired, the SOW 
must be writt en to support only that labor category. This 
specificity would prevent the contractor from substituting in 
higher priced labor categories. 
A "creative" breakdown of labor categories might also 
show that the abilities ot a lower priced labor category may 
be encompassed within the abilities ot a higher priced labor 
category thereby allowing a contractor to substitute in the 
higher priced labor category under the guise that the lower 
priced labor category is unavailable. In this situation, the 
Government is compelled into not only the measures outlined 
above but should consider the following two other controls. 
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Firs t, a Rtatement could be placed in the delivery order that 
onl y the lower priced labor category is accep:..-able for the 
requirement . Second, a provision CQuid also be placed in the 
original IDTC which states in essence, "in situations where 
Multiple labor categories could pertorm the Government 
requirement, the Government will reimburse at the rate of the 
lowe r priced l ahor category, regardless of how the c ontracto r 
assigns his labor force ," or words to that effect. 
9 • Problem NINE - Contractor Buy-ins 
The contracting officer's best protection against a 
buy-in is to be alert during the bid or proposal evaluat i o n 
for the two key indicators noted in Chapter IV, and not award 
to that contractor. If the a ward is already made however, the 
cont.racting officer must take appropria t.e action to ensure 
buying in losses are not recovered by the contractor through 
unnecessary or e xcessively priced change orders [Ref. 5:part 
3. 50 1.1. The implementation of a well-conceived binding 
ceiling price is an excellent. means of preventing unnecessary 
cost g rowth. If t.he contracting officer suspects a buy - i n, 
he/she should also alert the Administrative contracting 
Offi c er (ACOJ, the Contracting Officer's Techni cal 
Represent.at.ive (COTR), and t.he requiring activity to be extra 
vigilant before ini t iating or allowing any change orders. 
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C. PROPOSED INCENTIVES TO IMPLEMENT 
The controls outlined ahove will help to alleviate the 
difficulties presented in Chapter IV however , the use of other 
incentives and/or controls might also prevent these problems 
from occurring in the first place. This section will explore 
possible incentives. 
As stated in Chapter II, the traditional view of T & M 
contract incentives is that the prime incentive is for the 
contractor to increase labor hours in order to increas e 
profit. Chapter III also pointed out that while Government 
use of T & M contracts appears to be increasing, the 
wi llingness of contractor s to enter into T & M contracts is 
decreasing, primarily due to uncertainties in inflation and 
its adverse affect on fixed -labor rates. Chapter IV suggested 
that one of the primary reasons contracting activities 
appreciated T & M contracts was due to their simplicity 
however, a large amount of this simplicity was due to 
disregard of existing regulations in order to expedite award 
of the contract. 
When attempting to propose possible incentives or 
restructuring of the T & M contract, there must be a balance 
between the additional administrative effort required a nd the 
benefit received. Many factors must be examined before 
deciding on the use of incentives or controls on a T & M 
including: contract duration; dollar value; 
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availability of persQ!1nel assets to administer; markeL 
uncerLainty; level of competition; expediency to award; eLc. 
in some cases, it may be more cost effective merely too 
increase surveillance lhan to take addiLional Lime formulat ing 
incentives or cont r o ls. In the experience of one contrar:t ing 
activity who underLook a $60 million CPAF conLract, they 
sLaled, " the additional administration was a nightmare. 
imagine the problem on a smaller value T & M contract." 
[Ref. 35] Another contracting activity questione d 
incentivizing a T & M contract (unless a Lru ly unique 
incentive could be developed) when other forms of incent i ve 
contracts al r eady exist [Ref. 36]. 
When attempting to propose possible incentives or 
restructuring of Lhe T & M conLracL to mitigate problems, t he 
overall objecLive should be to maximize Lhose characteristics 
Lhat do not increase risk to either party while minimizing the 
administrative efforL to implemenL and administer t he 
controls . More specifically, three fundamental goals must 
underl i e any consideration to changing t.he existing T & M 
These goals a r e: 
1) Simplicity in Award and Surveillance 
2) Ease of BudgeLing 
3) Reduced Risk Compared to Traditional T & M Contract 
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Several alternatives were considered and dismissed because 
they did not satisfy the three above goal s. Among those 
cons i dered and dismissed included: 
• Use of Two Contractors for Repair or Overhaul Work. Under 
this concept, one contractor would do the troubleshooting 
and another contractor would complete the repairs. The 
concept was discarded for two reasons. First, more 
administration is required during pre - award s i nce two 
contractors are involved, thereby violating the goal of 
simplicity. Second, the Government would have to put an 
implied warranty on the troubleshooting efforts of the 
first contractor in order for the second contractor to 
accept the troubleshooting report. 
• Use of an Award Fee Concept. This possibility was 
broached with several contracting activities with 
predominantly negative responses. The primary argument 
was increased administration, which violates the goal of 
simplicity. Other arguments included: difficulty in 
budgeting; subjectivity not favored by contractors; 
availability of other award fee contract types; risk not 
fundamentally less than a T & M contract with a ceiling 
price; and that since the nature of the T & M contract is 
that the extent and duration of the effort is unknown, 
there should not be any tying of the award to finishing 
the contract early. This would create an incentive to 
inflate the initial estimate to make it easier to finish 
early. Although other factors besides delivery could be 
the basis for the award, more time would be required to 
determine and then negotiate them. 
• Use of an Incentive Fee Concept. The use of an incentive 
fee was viewed essentially the same as an award fee. 
Again, the primary arguments were increased adminis-
tration, difficulty in budgeting, and availability of 
other incentive fee contract types. Although subjectivity 
would be less, negotiating a Range of Incentive Effec-
tiveness would also be more difficult than negotiating a 
ceiling price. 
Although the above pOSSibilities were dismissed, two other 
proposals are viable. The first is incorporating an Economic 
Price Adjustment (EPA) into the T & M contract. The second is 
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to incorporate a fixed fee concept. The remainder ot this 
section will discuf:ls and analyze these two proposals. 
1. T &: M Contract with Economic Price Adjustment (EPA) 
Economic Price Adjustments (EPA) were originally 
designed to cope with the econo:nic uncertainties that threaten 
lon g-term f i xed -price arrangements [Ref. 37:p.1-21J. The 
hear t o[ the EPA lies in the objective that the contractor 
should benefit or lose in relation to his perfonnance, not due 
to c ircumstances outside his control. Because the T & M 
contract locks the contractor ioto a fixed -labor rate, the EPA 
concept may also be suited to this pricing arrangement. 
Without EPAs, contractors can be expected to quote 
contingency allowances ioto the T & M fixed - labor rate, l a r ge 
enough to eliminate or reduce the risk of loss. The danger o f 
t hese contingencies is obvious. The contractor may be hUrt if 
the changes exceed the estimate and the Government may p a y 
unreasonably high prices if the contingency does not 
materialize. As suggested in Chapter IV, being locked into a 
low f ixed-labor rate may also be a catalyst to other post 
awa r d p roblems. These dangers are amplified when the contract 
i s a lengthy IDTC with a base and several option years. It is 
the T & M IDTC with one or more option years which is best 
suited for an EPA. 
The first step in establishing an EPh is to determine 
an appropriate adjustment index that both parties can agree to 
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during negotiations. Since a T & M contract already 
re imburses materials at cost, only the l abor variable has 
uncertainty and therefore qualifies for adjustment. Although 
a labor index could be constructed that both parties might 
agree on, it would likely be easier to use an existing, 
recognized method of adjustment. Labor could be adjusted by 
actual labor costs or by consulting the U. S. Depar tment of 
Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) indexes which are 
categorized by industry and region [Ref. 4:p.14-14]. 
If actual labor costs are used, the contract schedule 
should describe in detail (1) the labor categories subject to 
adjustment, and (2) the l abor rates. Like the EPA clause for 
Fixed-Price with Economic Price Adjus tme nt (FPE) contracts, 
the T & M contract EPA clause should limi t the aggregate 
increase to 10 percent, and have no limit on downward 
adjustments if actua l labor costs are used. The adjustment 
should only apply to exogenous variables, 
controllable by management. If the BLS index is used, which 
is more appropriate for contracts exceeding one year in 
length , there should not be a 10 percent upper limit since 
inflation could exceed that amount. 
The next step is to determine what "triggers" the EPA . 
To cover this requirement, it i s suggested that a clause 
substantially the same as FAR 52.216 -4 be adopted, omitting 
all references to materials. This clause provides procedures 
on contractor submissions of EPA requests and the negotiation 
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process of the EPA. The contractor must be able to support 
the p ropofl e d costs and t heir application. The negotiation 
process provides agreement that the trigger was indeed hi t t o 
al low determination of a new fixed-labor rate and corres-
ponding new contract amount and ceiling. 
The following are the adva:1tages and disadvantages of 
t h is proposal. 
ADVANTAGES 
• 'I'he inclusion of an EPA in a T & M con tract would take out 
all contractor uncertainty regarding labor costs and 
therefore the Government would expect a corresponding 
decrease in the negotiated fixed-labor rate. 
• The ceiling price would be expected to be lower. 
• The p r ofit portion of the fixed-labor rate would be less 
s ince t.here is minimal uncertainty and no need to build -i n 
c an t ingencies. 
• With the labor cost uncertainty gone, the con~ractor would 
have no legitimate reason to resort to post award 
st rategies to intentionally increase his labor hours. 
• An EPA could encourage contractors to enter into lengthy 
T & M IDTCs , contributing to long - term supplier 
relationships. 
DI SADVANTAGES 
• More administ.rat.ive effort is required during pre -award to 
estab l ish and negotiate the adjustment index for the EPA . 
• More administrative effort is required during post. award 
to negotiat.e a new fixed-labor rate and a new ceiling 
price when the contractor submit.s an EPA request. 
• Budgeting becomes slightly more complicated under the EPA 
since figures will change if the escalation clause is 
exercised. 
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2. T &. M. Contract with a Fixed Fee 
As illustrated in characteristic ONE of Table VI, the 
fixed profit percentage built into the negotiated fixed-labor 
rate creates an incentive for the contractor to increase labor 
hours in order to increase profit. A logical means of 
preventing this is to take the profit out of the fixed-labor 
rate. This section proposes the notion of a fixed fee/profit. 
Eliminating the profit in the fixed-labor rate and 
establishing a fixed fee would eliminate any variability in 
profit. The contractor would receive a fixed fee regardless 
of the actual number of labor hours used. I n this proposal, 
a ceiling on the number of hours is recommended to reduce the 
problem of characteristic TWO from Table VI (i.e. the ability 
to realize a higher profit percentage after fixed elements of 
overhead are covered). The example provided in Figure 5 cf 
Chapter IV is re-visited using a fixed fee concept. The new 
example provided in Figure 7 illustrates the Rate of Return 
(ROR) advantage to the contractor of finishing the work in 
less time. 
Figure 7 shows a distinct ROR advantage to the contractor 
for finishing in the least amount of time as possible. It 
shows a clear ROR advantage of not increasing costs up to t he 
ceiling. In this regard it resembles a fixed -price type 
contract. Advantages and disadvantages of this proposal 
follow Figure 7. 
EXAMPLE 
Fixed Fee Concept Combined 
wi th a T & M Contract 
A contractor is hired to repair a malfunctioning ship-
board magnet ic compass since ship's force was unable 
to affect repairs. Both parties agree to a T & M 
contract with a f i xed fee since the nature of repairs 
is u nknown . There is an agreed on fixed - labor rate of 
$2 7 .00 per hour (which i s fully burdened except for 
p rofi t ), and a fixed fee of $~O.OO. Materials come to 
$ ~~ O . 00 including material handling costs. A ceiling 
o f 8 hours is negotiated. A ROR comparison follows; 
Fixed- Labor Rate 
Fixed Fee 
Mat e r ials 
Total Cost to Govt 
Profit to Contractor 
Ra te of Return (ROR) * 
Contractor 
Finishes 
in 3 hours 
$ 81. 00 
10.00 
110.00 












* Fo r th i s example ROR is calculated as f ixed fee 
divided by total labor to illustrate only the 
labo r effect on differences in the ROR. 
Figure 7 . Example of Fixed Fee Concept with T & M 
Contract 
ADVANTAGBS 
• The primary opportunity for increased labor hours leading 
to increased profit is eliminated since profit/fee is 
fixed . 
• The contractor is encouraged to use fe wer hours than a 
regular T & M contract in order to earn a higher Rate of 
Return (ROR). When the fee is fixed, the contractor's ROR 
increases as labor hours (costs) decrease, which is an 
incentive t o finish earlier. 
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• The Fixed Fee concept is only s lightly more difficult to 
administer than a regular T & M contract. Negotiations 
would have to determine a fixed fee in addition to a 
fixed · labor rate (which now excludes profit). In a sealed 
bid scenario, the contractor wou ld bid a fixed~labor rate 
(which is fully burdened except for profit), a separate 
fixed fee/profit, and an estimate on materials. A 
contracting officer could quickly and easily compare and 
contrast separate contractor bids. It would be readily 
apparent whose costs and profit are lower . In a compet-
itive proposal or sole-source scenario, only the fixed fee 
and the ceiling on hours would likely be subject to 
disagreement, since the fixed-labor rate is purely based 
on costs which the contractor would have to support. 
• A binding ceiling on the number of hours can and should be 
implemented to limit cost growth. If a contractor 
exceeded the ceiling on hours, it would cut into his fixed 
fee, and not result in the Government paying more. In 
exceptional circumstances , the contracting officer could 
increase the ceiling on the hours if events outside the 
contractor's control prevent finishing under the ceiling. 
• Ease of budgeting i s still maintained. Because the 
contractor's profit/ f ee is fixed, and there is a ceiling 
on the hours , the contract becomes in essence a fixed-
price contract after the ceiling i s reached. 
• This proposal can be combined with the above proposal t o 
include an EPA. Inclusion of an EPA would also likely 
allow the fixed fee/profit and the ceiling to be lower. 
DISADVANTAGES 
• Characteristic TWO from Table VI is still present to some 
extent. There is still the incentive to increase labor 
hours up to the ceil ing in order to cover more of the 
fixed elements of overhead to realize a higher ending 
profit once fixed costs are covered. This can be 
mi tigated however, through use of a well-conceived binding 
ceiling on the number of hours. 
The previous two proposals could be implemented separately 
together depending on the s ituation. Both keep the 
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administ r ation and budgeting process relatively simple without 
substan t ially increasing the risk to either party. 
The PAR currently has no provisions for either of the two 
proposals recommended above. The EPA concept however, was 
used i n an Air Force T & M IDTC for i nstalling and maintaini ng 
secur e conununications switches (Red Switches) [Ref. 2 9 :p.l2 ) . 
Although this particular contract had many other problems 
associated with it, no negative mention of the EPA provis ion 
was made in the audit report. Because the advantages of t h e 
fixed fee concept with a T & M contract seem to outweigh the 




an experimental basis to ascertain its 
Chapter V has discussed and analyzed the controls which 
should be considered to mitigate the pre-award diff iculties 
outlined in Chapter IV. The controls suggested can serve as 
a management guide to consult during pre-award to alleviate 
the occurrence of future difficulties. The chapter also 
examined possible incentives/controls which might be 
instituted to further reduce the risk of the traditional 
T & M contract and improve its overall efficiency and 
acceptance. Two hybrid variations of the T & M contract were 
postulated, one using an EPA and the other a fixed fee 
concept. 
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The following chapter will examine those controls which 
should be incorporated to mitigate the post award difficu l ties 
presented in Chapter IV. These controls can serve as a 
management guide, to consult during post award, to alleviate 
these difficulties. 
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VI. TIME AND MATBRIALS CONTRACT POST AWARD CONTROLS 
I NTRODUCTION 
Thi s chapter analy ze s the post award difficulties outlined 
in Chapter IV and proposes controls to mitigate their 
The chapter will begin wi th a general discussion 
of s urveillance requirements, factors, and responsibilities. 
This i s followed by suggested controls and surveillance to 
implement which can be used as a management guide to reference 
during post award for mitigating the T & M contract post award 
d i f ficul ties outl ioed in Chapter IV. 
B. GENERAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 
Whereas controls in the pre-award phase can take the form 
of incentives, controls in the post award arena are primarily 
established through surveillance. The FAR's guidance 
Government surveillance of T & M contracts is very broad, it 
states, 
A time - and - materials contract provides no positive prOfit 
incentive to the contractor for cost control or l abor 
efficiency. Therefore, appropriate Government 
surveillance of contractor performance is required t o give 
r e asonable assurance that efficient methods and effective 
cost controls are being used. (Ref. 5:part 16 .601( b) (1)] 
The obj ecti ve of this chapter is to provide a management 
guide to reference during post award of T & M contracts to 
assist in the FAR requirement of "appropriate Government 
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surveillance of contractor performance." general, 
performance surveillance is function of 
administration used to determine contrac tor progress and to 
identify any factors that may delay perfonnance. Perfonnance 
surveillance involves Government review and analysis of 
contractor performance plans, sched ules, controls, and 
industrial processes as well as the contractor's actual 
performance under them [Ref. 2:p.2431. 
1. Surveillance Factors 
Any discussion of surveillance must be tempered with 
addressing factors which should be considered in determining 
the appropriate leve l of performance surveillance . Naturally, 
not all contracts will receive the same level of surveillance 
due to resource Constraints. Factors wh ich should be 
considered in determining an appropriate level of Government 
surveillance include [Ref. 5:part 42. 1104]; 
• Size of the contract in terms of; length of period of 
performance; estimated cost; extent of the effort 
involved; and total price. 
• Significance of the contract i n relation 
organizational objectives. 
overal l 
• Nature and complexity of the work which contributes to 
risk allocations. 
• Dependency of other programs/contracts on the outcome. 
• Type of contract being administered. 
• Location where the work is being performed. 
• Impact of modifications and changes on the contract. 
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• Contrac t or'S past history of contract performance. 
• Contractor ' S experience with the type of effort involved. 
• Availability of adequate monitoring resources, including 
personnel and progress measuring techniques. 
• Contracts less than the small purchase threshold (S25,000) 
do not generally require surveillance. 
2. Post Award Orientation Conference 
Once the above factors have been considered, the 
contractor must be briefed on the nature and level of planned 
surveillance. One of the best means of doing this is through 
the Post Awar-d orientation Conference (PAOe). The PAoe also 
serves to achieve a clear and mutual understand ing of all 
contract requirements and identifies and resolves potentia l 
problems. A sample PAGC agenda, which outl i nes the essential 
discussion items for a T & M Contract, is included 
Appendix D . 
In connection with preparing for the PAOC, the ACO, 
team leader, should convene a meeting of all functional 
spec ialists, including DCAA auditors, who wi l l be involved in 
the surveillance of contract performance. The purpose of this 
meeting is to develop a coordinated p lan estiiblishing the 
action and surveillance responsibility for each team member, 
with the plan reduced to writing and included in the contract 
file. At a minimum the plan will provide for [Ref . 3B:part 
1 6.601] : 
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• A determination of the adequacy of the contractor's 
accounting system to accurately identify and record costs 
and to provide a basis for auditing. 
• Surveillance of the contractor's plant operations to 
ensure that the direct labor and direct materials being 
charged to the contract are allowable, allocable, and 
reasonable. The plan must provide for periodic floor and 
time card checks to ascertain quantities and types of 
direct material and direct labor actually being used. 
Periodic floor and time card checks are the primary means 
by which the Government detects whether or not it is being 
inappropriately charged. 
• Periodic audits of the contractor's billings under the 
contract. Such audits may be coordinated with a periodic 
floor check. 
• Ensuring full and complete communication with the ACO and 
other team members on the status of surveillance efforts. 
3. Contracting Officer's Technical Representative 
The PAGC can also be a prime opportunity for the 
Government to introduce principal participants in the post 
award phase of the contract. One of the key players in the 
Navy contracting system is the Contracting Officer's Technical 
Representative (COTR) , sometimes referred the 
Contracting Officer's Representative (COR). The COTR is 
appointed in writing by t h e PCO after completing Naval Supply 
Systems Command (NAVSUP) approved COTR training. The COTR's 
primary duty is to provide technical direction/clarification 
and guidance with respect to the contract speci f ications 
statement of work. Other COTR responsibilities include 
[Ref. 39J: 
• Revi ew of contractor invOices to ensure that labor hours, 
labor mix, materials, travel, and other direct cos t s 
identified are consistent and reasonable for the effort 
completed during the period covered by the invoice . He 
s hould ensure invoices are in sufficient detai l, i n the 
way of adequate breakdown by individual task and man hours 
b y labor category, to permit verification. 
• Maintenance of a COTR file by contract and/or delivery 
order which contains documentation relative to the actions 
taken by the COTR. 
• Monitoring the contractor's progress and identifying 
promptly to the pea all observed substantive deficiencies 
in contract performance or other instances of non-
compliance with contract tenns or conditions. 
• Identify periodically to the PCO the cumulative incurred 
hours in each labor category resulting from taskings if 
the contract specifies a labor mix and requires 
identification of estimated or negotiated hours in the 
technical direction or task order. 
• Submission, to the contracting and ordering officers, a 
written report on contractor performance. Thi s report 
must be submitted within 60 days of contract (delivery 
order) completion, but in no event less than annua ll y. 
The report should be compiled from COTR file documentat ion 
and should address all aspects of contractor performance 
including cost effectiveness, quality, and timeliness. 
• Review technical qualifications of proposed substitute key 
personnel. 
As the above indicates, the COTR is a key player and 
assistant to the PCO and ACO during post award and can be 
valuable during pre-award as well. AS a technical expert, the 
COTR is especially crucial in monitoring T & M contracts s ince 
little reference material or standardization is usually 
available to assist in the surveillance effort. The COTR's 
technical abilities also make them an excellent resource prior 
negotiating del ivery orders under an IDTC since they can 
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scope out jobs and job sites to provide a Government estimate 
on labor hours and mater i als to validate contractor bids and 
proposals. An excellent NAVSUP instruction exists which 
outlines the requirement for a COTR and provides: sample 
nomination and appointment letters; a COTR functional review 
questionnaire; a contractor's invoice review form; a sample 
report Of contractor's performance; and requirements for a 
proper COTR documentation file [Ref. 39]. 
The importance of the COTR's role in preventing post 
award difficulties is evident in the proposed controls which 
follow. The COTR is d irectly involved in controlling eight of 
the eleven post award difficulties summarized i n Table VIII. 
Only in problems SEVEN, EIGHT, and TEN is the COTR's 
responsibility negligible. The next sect i on will examine post 
award controls and/or surveillance to mitigate the problems 
highlighted in Chapter IV. 
C. CONTROLS TO PREVENT POST AWARD DIFFICULTIES 
This section will analyze the post award difficulties 
presented in Chapter IV and propose controls and adequate 
surve i llance to alleviate them. The reader will find it 
useful to periodical l y refer to Table VIII since the problems 
summarized in it will be referred to , by number, extensively 
in this analysis. The proposed controls will assume the 
status quo, in that neither the EPA or fixed-fee concepts 
proposed in Chapter V were implemented. 
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It should be pointed out however, that inclusion of an EPA 
and/or a fixed-tee concept, may well reduce the amount of 
surveillance required on a T & M contract. Six of the eleven 
post award prohlems would likely he affected in a posit ive 
manner if the two recommended incentives from Chapter V were 
i mplemented. Specifically, prohlems ONE through FOUR, KIGHT, 
a n d NINE, would all l ikely be mitigated if the contractor were 
only compensated with a fixed-~ee and allowed to index his 
fixed-labor rate to in-:lation. 
Nevertheless, the -:ollowing are proposed controls to the 
post award problems presented in Chapter IV. 
1 . Problem ONE - Illcentive to Inf late Labor Hours 
The contractor's incentive to in-:late labor hours to 
increase profits under the traditional T & M contract can b e 
mitigated through five proposed controls. 
a. Clear Statf'.DIf'..nt Of Work (SOW) 
The importance of a clear SOW cannot b e 
overemphasized since a nebulous SOW can give the contractor 
the opportunity to charge nebulous hours. This control 
obviously must begin in the pre-award phase when the SOW is 
drafted. A very specific SOW with detailed line items for 
each different ac t i on is essential to provide the COTR a 
suitable reference to compare labor-hour charges to contract 
requirerr.ents and to allow holding the contractor accountable 
for the hours charged. The contractor can and should be 
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required to pinpoint l a b or hours charged against SOW line 
numbers, thus allowing simple correlation of labor charges to 
contract requirements. 
b. Review of Payroll Procedures 
A rev i ew of the contractor's internal time card 
and payroll p rocedures may reveal inadequate procedures for 
contraIl ing labor costs. Appendix E contains a checkl ist for 
the review of the contractor's time card and payroll 
procedures. 
c. Proper Invoice Procedures 
I nvoices must be reviewed and certified by 
Goverrunent representatives who are in a position to determi ne 
if amount s billed are p roper and necessary. This requirement 
should start with the requiring activi t y, followed by the COTR 
also reviewing and signing invoices before submitta l to the 
ACO for payment. 
Invoices must also be submitted in suffi cient 
detail to permit verification of contractor charges. Invoices 
must inc l ude detai l s of charges to individual tasks from the 
SOW and must identify man-hours charged to spec ific l abor 
categories. 
d. Monthly Time Report 
All Navy con tracts which designate a COTR must 
also provide for the contractor to provide the Goverrunent a 
monthly contract status report [Ref. 39:p. 5 1. The rep ort must 
require information such as the number of hours expended, the 
126 
total costs incurred, the average hourly rate incurred, 
accomplish.'llents to date, data status and delivery, etc. The 
report should a 1 so provide by name. who is charging hours and 
to what contract line item, and explain all schedule slippage 
against a schedule outline. The report must be sent to the 
pea, C01'R, and the ordering officer (if applicable). The 
requirement is easily fulfilled by inclusion of a data 
requirement on the DD Form 1423, Contract Data Requirements 
List. [Ref. 39:p.5] 
Monthly Program Management: Reviews (PHR) 
In larger l' & M contracts, monthly PMRs may be 
appropriate to evaluate the overall status of the contract and 
to resolve problems that may be affecting contractor 
performance. Problems reported in the monthly progress 
reports above should be discussed at a minimum. Periodic 
meetings between cognizant technical personnel and the 
contractor may also be held to discuss technical questions, 
important to both, to ensure the contractor is proceeding down 
the Government's desired path. 
2. Problem nfO - Ceiling Price Often Accomplishes Little 
on T " M Contract 
As stated in Chapter V, the Government's best 
assurance against unplanned cost growth lies in drafting the 
initial contract with a well-conceived binding ceiling price. 
If th i s is not done at the outset for whatever reason, a 
binding ceiling can also be incorporated during post award 
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after one or a number of overruns have occurred. This may be 
appropriate in those unique situations where the uncertainty 
is too great during pre-award to even attempt making the 
ceiling binding at t he outset. 
Regardless of when a binding ceiling is incorporated, 
the contractor must be made aware that the ceiling truly is 
binding and it denies the contractor's right to stop work when 
the ceiling is reached. Again, contracting officers must 
consult their legal staffs prior to incorporating any 
potentially conflicting clauses and conditions in contracts. 
3. Problem THREE - Use of Lower Skilled Workers 
The COTR's technical services are invaluable in 
monitoring t he work site for inefficient labor. Frequent 
floor checks, including time card reviews are the best means 
of detecting this problem. The Government may also put 
provisions in thei r T & M contracts allowing the right to 
request resumes on employees with questionable skills. 
4. Problem FOUR - Use of T " M Contract as Vehicle for 
Training New Personnel at Government Expense 
The same controls outlined for problem THREE also 
apply to problem FOUR. In addition , there are FAR guidelines 
if the contractor chooses to intentionally train new personnel 
at less t han the contracted wage rate [Ref. S:part 52.222 - 9]. 
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5. Problem FIVE - Use of T & M Contract as Vehicle for 
Ordering Non - Related Bquipment 
This problem can be mitigated through several simple 
actions. First, a clear SOW can greatly assist the COTR in 
his review of invoices to ensure material procured is 
reasonable and necessary for the contract. Also, purchases 
over a certain dollar value threshold could be designated in 
the contract as requiring pre-approval by the ACO. 
Additionally, a data base of materials ordered under 
a T & M contract cou:d be developed and maintained to screen 
f u ture materi al invoices against . Those materials not in the 
data base wou ld stand out as potentia l candidates for inquiry. 
This data base could also serve dS historical data for 
p ossible conversion of T & M contracts to FFP contracts in the 
future. Appendix F provides a simple checklist the COTR and 
ACO can consult to evaluate material requests. 
6 . Problem SIX - Problems With Over-and·Above Concept 
The DFARS prefers that the contractor and ACO mutually 
agree to procedures for administration of Over - and-Above work, 
but states the ACO can unilaterally direct the procedures if 
agreement cannot be met [Ref. 12:part 252 . 217-7029] . The ACO 
should nonetheless, determine procedures that minimize delay 
and disruption to the contractor 's effort to complete t he 
requirement, when repairs beyond what is covered in the basic 
conLract are encou!ltered. The procedures should be the 
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absolute minimum to prevent undue delay while still 
maintaining Government control of coat growth. 
Since the DFARS does allow blanket work request 
authorizations to streamline the process, consideration of a 
flexible process might benefit both parties with simplified 
administration [Ref. 12:part 217.77] . For example, a 
staggered process could be used, based on dollar value 
limitations, where increasingly more expensive Over-and-Above 
work would require greater cont rols. Small increases which 
are wi t hin the general scope of the requirement might only 
require a simple work request and approval memorandum (to 
provide the ACC sufficient information for executing a 
modification) whereas a larger increase may require a detailed 
work request and face-to-face negotiation of a fair and 
reasonable price for the modification. 
7. Problem SEVEN - Lack of Performance Flexibility Due to 
Fixed-Labor Rates 
All possible contingent labor categories should be 
incorporated into the basic contract at the outset to avoid 
having to initiate a modification to add a needed labor rate. 
If in doubt, a labor category with an associated fixed -labo r 
rate, should be included in the T & M contract up-front. The 
only remedy available if a needed labor category is not in the 
basic contract is to conduct negotiations, to determine t he 
fixed -labor rate for the proposed additional labor category, 
and initiate a modification . 
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8 . Prob lem EIGHT . Disadv antage of Fixed-Lahar Rates 
Dur ing Periods of Inflation 
The Government must recognize the effect inflation h a s 
f ixed labor rates and take appropriate action to prevent 
placing the contractor into untenable situations. Because 
th i s prob lem may contribute to problems ONE through FOUR and 
ELEVEN, the Government should either consider incorporating an 
Economic Price Adjustment or establishing shorter ternl 
contracts to alleviate the ettects ot inflation. 
9. Problem NINE - Lack of Resources for Adequate 
Surveillance 
This problem relates to the factors to consider when 
determining the nature and level of survei~lance described in 
Sec tion B above. No contract administration office has all 
the surveillance resources it desires, therefore it must 
c l osely analyze these factors determine a suitable 
assignment and mix of resources properly safe'juard the 
Government's interests. 
::onsideration can be given to requesting technicians 
or operators from the requiring activity to assist in 
surveillance. Although these personnel may not be concerned 
with t h e costs of restoring "their" system, they are very 
concerned with the system functioning properly. At some level 
ot the requiring activity however, there will be someone 
concerned with the cost of the repairs. be it the supply 
o ff icer, fiscal officer, comptroller, etc. Their assistance 
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should also be requested. The combination of these two 
part i es at the requiring activity can provide an invaluable 
outside resource when in - house assets are insufficient . The 
assistance of DCM can also be requested for larger T & M 
contracts. 
10. Problem TEN - Growing Contractor's Personnel System 
Changes 
This prob l em arises as a contractor grows and alters 
its labor categories. Since it is the contractor who is 
altering its labor categories, it is the contractor's 
responsibi l ity to provide and justify some sort of cross-
reference l ist to a l low the Government to make payment . 
Failure to provide and justify a change in labor categori es 
wou l d only hurt the contractor since payment cannot be made 
without it. This topic should be covere d duri ng the PAOe to 
advi se the contractor of what documentation is requi red for 
payment to occur. 
11. Problem ELEVEN - Time Card Fraud 
Section D of Chapter IV provided f i ve examples of time 
card difficulties which may indicate fraud. Recognizing these 
anomalies is the first step in discovering them. Even when 
unintentional or without a fraudulent motive, it undennines 
confidence in the contract or's accounting and control systems 
and shou l d raise quest i ons as to the validity of other 
submissions. It a l so taints historical data derived from the 
contract by making a contract appear more eff i cient than if 
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the true costs were known. The issue of whether a mischarge 
is a mis take or a crime re lates t o the intent of the maker and 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. If fraud is suspected, 
DCAA shou l d be called in for a complete audit. Suffice it to 
say, errors, regardless of intent, must be detected and 
corrected. 
The besL means of detecting time card difficulties is 
through frequent and random time card and floor checks. 
Frequent and random checks will assure the contractor that 
his records will be s c rutinized, motivating the contractor to 
ensur e his records are current. accurate, and complete . 
SllHMARY 
Chapter VI has proposed contrals to mi tigate the 
occurrence of the post award difficulties identified in 
Chapter IV. When available, the v i ews of procurement 
professionals concerning post award controls were discussed. 
The controls and surveillance suggested c an be used as a 
management guide to referenc e during post award to assist the 
contracting officer in the proper administration of T & M 
contracts. 
The next chapter presents the researcher' s conclusions and 
recommendations regarding the research effort. InCluded are 
answers to the primary and subsidiary research questions, and 
recommendations for further research . 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
RESTATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
The use of T & M contracts for obtaining needed supplies 
and services has traditionally been viewed with apprehension 
due to the potential for the Government to incur great cost 
risk during contract performance. However, T & M contract use 
is invaluable in situations where the e xt ent or duration of 
the work is unknown at the outset, to avoid undue risk on 
either party. This dichotomy established fertile ground for 
determining how to best manage the T & M contract, given that 
a determinat i on has been made that it is the best contractual 
vehicle available for a particular Government requirement. 
The goal of the research effort was to determine how to 
best manage the T & M contract, given t hat it is deemed the 
appropriate contracting method for a particular 
Government requirement. specifically, the objective of this 
study was to identify, to the maximum extent possible, the 
current areas of difficul t y associated with the T & M contract 
and to suggest pre-award and post award incentives and/or 
controls to institute to mitigate these difficulties. The 
proposed incentives and controls coul d be used as a reference 
during pre and post award to mitigate the potential adverse 
effects of this contracting method. 
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B. CONCLUSI ONS 
Based on the r esults of this study. the following 
conc l usi o ns can be drawn: 
• There has been a marked increase in both t he use and 
d i versity of use of T &. M contracts primarily due to the 
s i mplic i t y of the T " M contracting method. 
Tables II, III, and Appendix C illustrated, and persona l 
interviews confirmed, an expansion in T & M use and a 
diversity of use. Armed with only generalities and limi t ed 
res t r aints for appropriate uses of T & M contracts in the FAR 
and other literature, DOD contracting officers have developed 
many creative uses of this contracting method to meet 
Government requirements. Contribut ing to this expansion were 
the f ol lowing factors: 
• The only FAR criterion for the use of a T & M contract is 
that uncertainty in the extent or duration of the work is 
too great to accurately estimate costs with any reasonable 
degree of confidence. 
• The only barriers to the use of a T & M contract are that 
a Determination and Findings (D & F) must be executed and 
a ceiling price must be established. 
• From the research effort, T & M contracts were found to be 
easier to budget, easier to a ward, generally require fewer 
modifications, and merge very well with IDTCs. All these 
features are viewed favorably by busy contracting officers 
under pressure to meet mandatory schedules imposed on 
them. 
The above factors indicate simplicity in the use of T & M 
Simplicity, in and of itself is not bad, but in 
fact is needed in Government contracting to s t reamli ne the 
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acquisition process, provided existing regulations are not 
circumvented. The FAR restraints of a D & F and a ceiling 
IJrice would generally curtail excessive use of T & M contracts 
if strictly followed however, audit reports have routinely 
cited these as discrepancies. The danger occurs because those 
actions taken during pre-award to "expedite" award often 
necessitate increased surveillance during post award . 
• Contracting officers are not cOJDpletely adhering 
existing regulations outlined in the FAR nor are 
supervisors adequately ensuring these regulations are 
being met. 
The FAR requirements af executing a D & F and including a 
ceiling price are often discrepancies in audits of T & M 
contracts. It is likely that time constraints motivate busy 
contracting officers to "bend the rules" and do a less than 
adequate job of meeting regulations. Likewise, supervisors 
are under the same pressures and constraints, contributing 
further to marginal compliance with reasonable regulations. 
Generally speaking, although upper echelons of the Government 
discourage T & M contract use, the closer one gets to where 
the contracting work is actually performed, the more the 
Government likes the T & M contracting method due to its 
simplicity. 
The FAR regulations have two primary objectives. First, 
the intent of the FAR limitation requiring a D & F was 
presumably to minimize the use of T & M contracts (due to 
136 
their traditional incentive for the contractor to increase 
labor hours to inr:rease profit) by requiring contracting 
officers to justify that no other contracting method is 
suitable. Second, the requirement for a ceiling price wa s 
likely to reduce the potential for unplanned cost growth. 
Both of t hese objectives are reasonable given the potential 
difficulties of traditional T & M contracts. This 
reasonableness was c onfirmed during personal interviews since 
no one contacted reconunended reducing either of these 
requirements. 
The overall goal therefore, is to determine an 
u ncomplicated means for contracting officers to meet these two 
objectives while taking advantage of the simplicity of this 
pricing arrangement and r:linimizing the administrative effort 
of implementing and enforcing the intent of the regulations. 
Possible restructuring of the T [;, M contract may achieve these 
two objectives while minimizing administrative effort . 
• Contractors do not favor T & M contracts in times o f 
actual o r expected infla t ion due to the fixed-labor rate. 
The negative effect of being locked into a fixed-labor 
rate is obvious when a contractor's prices are rising. The 
problem is exacerbat.ed in lengthy IDTCs with a base year and 
several option years. Contractors are reluctant to enter into 
T & M contracts during actual or anticipated inflation without 
escalation options being available. This problem has received 
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minimal attention over the last several years since inflation 
in the United States has been kept very low. If inflation 
were to escalate, this issue would become significant for both 
contracting officers and contractors. As such, thought should 
be devoted to this problem now whi le there is time to 
thoroughly think the process through . 
• The Government's primary reservation with 'I' 6< M. contracts 
lies in the characteristic that increased labor hours 
leads to increased profit to the contractor. 
The T & M contract has a fixed profit percentage built 
into the negotiated fixed-labor rate. Because the quantity of 
labor is highly variable during contract performance, there is 
an opportunity for the contractor to simply increase labor 
hours, up to the ceiling, to increase his profit. This 
supports the traditional view that T & M contracts provide 
little incentive to control costs. Al t hough there is no 
argument that the contractor should be adequately rewarded for 
the risk he entails, he should not have the opportuni ty for 
added profit due to either planned unplanned 
inefficiencies. Ideally, the contractor should be fairly 
rewarded wi th profit based on his risks, not 
overcompensated at the Government's expense . 
• The majority of 'I' &. M. contract pre·award problems are 
UDder the complete control of the contracting officer to 
mitigate or eliminate. 
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Seven of the nine problems noted during pre-award are 
directly controllable by the contracting officer and not the 
conLractor. Specifically, the following pre-award prob l ems 
can be directly controlled by the contracting officer with no 
assistance or support from t he contractor; 
• Award of a T & M contract despite availability of 
historical data for awarding a FFP contract. 
• Improper eva l uation of T &- M contract options. 
• 0 & F not prepared or not prepared properly. 
• Improper forwarding of T & M contrac t copies. 
• Appl ication of improper profit percentages. 
• Failure to include required ceiling price. 
• Improper estimates on ID - RC contribute to higher 
contractor overhead. 
This finding is significant because it indicates the 
Government can control a significant amount of pre-award 
T & M contract risk since they control all of these factors. 
Adherence to existing regulations and guidance by contracti ng 
officers wou ld preclude all of these problems and thus, a 
rr.ajority of the pre-award T & M contract problems. 
• A slight majority of T &. H contract post award problems 
are the responsibility of the contractor and. thus require 
adequate Government surveillance to mitigate. 
Although many of the T & M contract pre-award problems are 
directly controllable by the contracting officer, several post 
award problems are primarily controllab l e by the contractor, 
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necessitating adequate Government surveillance to mitigate 
them. Specifically, the contracting officer must be alert for 
the following post award problems: 
• The incentive of the contractor to inflate labor hours. 
• The ceiling price can accomplish little on a T & M 
contract if it is viewed as non-binding. 
• The contractor's use of lower-skilled workers. 
• The contractor's use of the T & M contract as a vehicle 
for training new personnel at the Government's expense. 
• Contractor time card fraud. 
These problems can be either intentional or unintentional. 
Although the contractor may be purely motivated to maximize 
profit, he may have also been compelled to resort to many of 
the above abuses due to the adverse affect of being locked 
into a fixed-labor rate during an inflationary period. 
Regardless of the reason for the problems, it is incumbent 
upon the Government to establish adequate surveillance to 
mitigate these potential post award problems. 
• The Government can control pre-award and post award 
difficulties through proper planning, adherence to 
existing regulations, and use of existing resources. 
Although there is a potential for problems with T & M 
contracts in both the pre and post award phases, these 
difficulties can be mitigated by the Government through proper 
controls. Among the controls found in this research effort 
were the following: 
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• Ensure a clear statement of work to help prevent a number 
of '1' & M contract probl ems. 
• Develop a database (preferably computerized) for rapid 
stor::ng and retrieval of historical data to allow award of 
FFP contracts. 
• Fo l low existing regulations, including: preparation of 
D & Fs; inclusion at ceiling prices; proper forwarding of 
contract coples; proper determinat ions of prof i l 
percentages; and proper exercising of T & M contract 
options . 
• Establish wel l -conceived binding ceiling prices, which 
have been reviewed by the legal staff, since they are the 
primary means of preventing undesired cost growth . 
• Ensure supervisors become more invol ved in the award and 
administration of T & M CO:1tracts in bach establishing and 
enforcing existing regulations and internal procedures. 
• Exploit the invaluable COTR resource during both pre and 
post award LO provide insight and recommendations. 
• Promote and capitalize on the Post Award Orientation 
Conference (PAGC) since it is invaluable to iron out 
potential difficulties before they occur. 
• Utilize monthly Performance Management Reports (PMRs) as 
an additional too l to prov::'de status of T & M contracts_ 
• Carefully evaluate surveillance requiremem::s to match the 
complex ity of the Govern."'l1ent requirement. 
C_ RECOMMENDATIONS 
I n the course of this research effort, several areas were 
highlighted where changes to current practices and/or policies 
could provide worthwhile improvemen ts in the effectiveness of 
Anyone or all of the proposed 
reconur,endations which follow would help t o mitigate the 
potential difficulties of T & M contracts. 
• Supervisors must develop streamlined requirements for 
preparing Determinations and Findings and better 
communicate these requirements to their respective 
contracting officers. 
Since the FAR requirement for a D & F is deemed 
appropriate, the goal should be to determine the most 
streamlined means of achieving the intent of the regulation. 
To begin, the format of a D & F for a T & M contr-act should be 
the topic of discussion to ascertain its minimum requirements 
in order to prepare a class D & F. Involved in the discussion 
should be experienced peos and ACOs, their supervisors, and 
oeM. 
The focus of the class D & F format should not be to make 
a T & M contract the path of least resistance but more to 
streamline the D & F requirement when it has been determined 
that the T & M pricing arrangement is the best means of 
obtaining needed supplies or services. Because a class D & F 
must be for a specified period of time, contracting offices 
should request OCAA assistance both before and after the 
period to evaluate the 0 & F's effectiveness and modify it 
accordingly. 
Once the format is determined, training must be conducted 
to communicate the results. Frequent review and a dedicated 
effort for continuous improvement will also be necessary to 
ferret out difficulties early on and create a class 0 & F that 
is both streamlined and meets the intent of the regulation. 
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• Contracting offices must dev elop well-conceived binding 
ceiling price articles for inclusion in T &: M contracts. 
A precisely drafLed binding ceiling price can operate to 
deny the contractor of additional funding beyond the ceil ing 
while requiring him to complete perfonnance within the 
st ipulat.ed amount. It is extremely important for contracting 
offices to have their legal staffs review potentia l ceiling 
articles to ensure the enforceability of a b i nding ceiling. 
Likewise, once the ceilings became truly binding, much more 
consideration and time will be required to negotiate them 
wi t h o ut increasing risk to either party . 
• The Government should consider incorporating Economic 
Price Adjustments (EPA) into lengthy T & M contracts to 
minimize contractor risk when inflation is present or 
expected. 
The contractor should benefit or l ose in relation to his 
perfo~nce, not due to factors outside his control . Without 
EPAs, contractors can be expected to quote contingency 
allowances i nto the T & M fixed-labor rate, large enough to 
eliminate or reduce the risk of loss. The danger of these 
contingencies i s obvious. The contractor may be hurt i f the 
changes exceed the estimate and the Government may pay 
unreasonably high prices if the contingency 
material izes . The contractor may also be reluctant to even 
enter into a T & M contract even if the Government desires it. 
Addit ionally, Jack of an EPA may contribute to numerous post 
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award problems where the contractor is compelled to take 
various actions, which may not be in the Government's best 
interests, to minimize his losses. 
Several advantages would be realized if EPAs were 
incorporated into T & M contracts . First, inclusion of EPAs 
in lengthy T & M contracts would take out all contractor 
uncertainty regarding labor costs and therefore the Government 
would expect a corresponding lower negotiated fixed- l abor rate 
and ceiling price. Second, with the labor cost uncertainty 
gone, the contractor would have no legitimate reason to resort 
to post award actions to cut his losses. Finally, an EPA 
would not eliminate this contracting method from consideration 
during times of inflation . 
• The Government should explore the possibility of 
developing and undertaking aT&' M contract with a fixed 
fee, on a trial basis. 
A l ogical means of eliminating the opportunity for a 
contractor to increase his lahor hours in order to increase 
profit would be to omit the profit component built into the 
fixed - labor rate, and compensating the contractor for profit 
in a manner which does not encourage inefficiency. A fixed 
fee concept wou ld accompl i sh this while maintaining simpli city 
in negotiations, award, budgeting, and post award. 
Negotiations would only be slightly more complicated since 
a fixed fee in addition to the fixed - labor rate (which now 
excludes profit) wou ld have to be determined. All other 
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negotiation points would remain the same as under the 
traditional T & M contract. On l y the amount of the fixed fee 
and the cei l ing wou l d likely be subj ect to disagreement, since 
the fixed- l abor rate is purely based on costs which the 
contractor would have to support. The PALT wou l d also not be 
longer under this proposal. 
Ease of budgeting is sti l l ma i ntained. Unless the ceiling 
i s increased, for whatever reason, the worst case cost of the 
contract is known up front. 
Post award difficulties of inflating hours wou l d be 
unlikely. Incorporating a f i xed fee would eliminate any 
variabi l ity in profit with the contractor receiving the same 
fixed fee regardl ess of the length of time the requirement 
takes. Since the contractor actually receives a higher ROR if 
he finishes early, he is incentivized to be effic i ent. 
Although there i s some incent i ve [or the contractor to 
increase h o urs up to the ce i l lng in order to recover more 
fixed elements ot overhead and G & A, the use of a well -
c.oncelved binding ceiling would help mitigate this. 
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. . Primary Research Question 
Wha t: are the principa~ featureH of the Time and 
Materia1.s cont:ract: that are the sources of difficu~ties aod 
how might: these difficult:ies be mit:igat:ed? 
The primary feature of a T & M contract which 
contributes to difficul t ies is that inc l usion of a fixed 
profit percentage in the fixed-labor rate encourages the 
contractor to increase l abor hours in order to increase 
profit. Additionally, the effect of overabsorbed overhead, 
the simplicity of the contracting method, the leverage effect 
of t h e cei l ing price, and the fact that materia l is reimbursed 
at cost creates no incentive for efficient material 
management, are all features of the T & M contract which 
contribute to difficUlties. Chapters V and VI proposed 
several controls and incentives mitigate these 
difficulties. 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
What are t:he principal characteristics of t:he 
T & H contract? 
The principal characteristics of a T & M contract 
are that the contract provides for acquiring supplies or 
services on the basis of (1) direct labor hours at specified 
fixed-hourly rates that include wages, overhead, G & A 
expenses, and profit and (2) materials at cost, including 
material handling costs as part of material costs, if 
appropriate. Section 8 of Chapter II provided a thorough 
descripti on of each of these T & M contract elements. 
146 
b . When are T Ii M contractB commonly used? 
Time and Material contracts are primarily used 
only when it is not possible at the time of placing the 
contract to estimate accurately the e xtent or duration of the 
.... o rk or to anticipate co;;ts with any reasonable degree of 
confidence. Chapter III further illustrated the many varied 
uses of T & M contracts and displayed usage statistics. 
What:: are the common difficulties of T Ii M 
contracts? 
There are numerous difficulties associated with 
T & M contracts which occur during both pre and posL award. 
Among those noted and analyzed in Chapter IV were the 
following: 
PRE · AWARD DI FFICULTIES 
• Award of T & M Contract despite availability of historical 
data for awarding FFP contracts. 
• Improper evaluation of T & M contract options. 
• D & F not prepared or not prepared properly. 
• Improper forwarding of T & M contract copies. 
• Applica t ion of improper profit percentages. 
• Fa i lure to include required ceiling price. 
• Improper estimates on ID-RC contribute to higher 
contrac:tor overhead. 
• unavailability of lower priced labor categories. 
• Contractor buy- ins. 
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POST AWARD DIFFICULTIES 
• Contractor incentive to inflate labor hou r s. 
• ceiling price often accomplishes little on T & M contract. 
• Contractor use of lower skilled workers. 
• Contractor use of T & M contract as vehicle for training 
new personnel at Government expense. 
• Government use of T & M contract as vehicle for ordering 
non- related equipment. 
• Problems with Over-and-Above concept. 
• Lack of performance flexibility due to fixed- labor rates . 
• Disadvantage of fixed-labor rates during p e riods of 
inflation. 
• Lack of resources for adequate surveillance. 
• Growing contractor's personnel system changes. 
• Time card f raud. 
d. What are the factors and characteristics of the 
T &, H contract which lead to these difficulties? 
The fol lowing five characteristics were noted in 
Chapter IV as the primary factors leading to T & M contract 
difficulties. 
• The fixed profit percentage built into the fixed -labor 
rate creates an opportunity for increased costs leading to 
increased profits . 
• The fixed elements of overhead and G & A that are built 
into the fixed -labor rate creates an opportuni ty for 
higher realized final profit percentages . 
• The simplicity of the T & M contracting method encourages 
proliferation. 




at cost creates no i:1:-:entive tor 
What: have various buying organizations used in 
order to control. T Ii M contract:s? 
Several T & M contract controls which have been 
imple:nented during pre-award are provided below: 
• Follow existing 





• Ensure supervisors become more involved in the award and 
administration of T & M contracLs in both establishi::lg and 
enforcing existing regu:ations and internal procedures. 
f. What: checks and ba~ances (incI"'Jlt:ive~ and 
deterrents) could a buyer implement during the pre-awll"d pnse 
that: would i;tssist: in motivating/ ensuring tile contractor 
performs a T & M contract as efficiently as p:Jssible? 
Chapter V proposed two primary controls and/or 
incentives which could be implemented to motivate the 
contractor to perform T & 1,'[ type contracts in a more efficient 
These controls included use of an EPA and 
i:nplementing a fixed fee concept into the traditional T & M 
"9 
These controls were also discussed in the 
recommendat ions section of t his chapter. 
g. Wbat per formance surveillance could b e applied 
during the post award phase to mitigate potential diffiaJlties 
of using l' & M contracts? 
The following are post award controls to mitigate 
potential difficulties: 
• Exploit the invaluable COTR resource during both pre and 
post award to provide insight and recormnendations. 
• Promote and capitalize on the Post Award orientation 
Conference (PAOC) since it is invaluable to iron out 
potential difficulties before they occur. 
• Utilize monthly Performance Management Reports (PMRs) as 
an additional tool to provide status of T & M contracts. 
• Carefully evaluate surveillance requirements to match the 
complex i ty of the Goverrunent requirement . 
AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY 
Conduct an actual case study of implement ing a T & M 
contract, on a trial basis, with a fixed fee feature to 
ascertain its feasibility. Ideally, the case study would 
include allowing a contracting activity to release a Request 
for Proposal (RFP) or Invitation for Bid (IFB) proposing this 
priCing arrangement for an actual require!1\8nt. The entire 
procurement process should be studied with emphasis on 
determining if the level of risk to either party is 
significantly different (either better or worse) t.han the 
traditional T & M pricing arrangement. 
Conduct research on developing a means of gathering 
and recording hisLorical data to allow rapid retrieval of this 
information La assist contracting officers in their required 
reviews of historical data before awarding T " M contracLs. 
The research should explore existing methods, if any, to 
determine if an adequate system exists and whether i t can b e 
expanded for use by other contracting offices. 
F. SUMMARY 
From this study, it is evid en t that traditional l' & M 
contracts provide little or no incentive for contractors to 
cont rol labor hours expended as evidenced by the nature and 
extent o f current problems. The current controls also 
incentivize the contractor to increase labor hours up to lhe 
ceiling in order to realize a higr.er prof i t. The existing 
regulations outlined in the FAR, if followed, would mitigate 
many of the problems but still do not incentivize the 
contractor to keep labor costs below the ceiling. Likewise, 
they run counter to the contracting officer's desire to 
quickly award contracts. Continued vigilance by contracting 
supervisors is needed to ensure the intent of regulations are 
followed. Implementing a fixed fee concept into the T & M 
contract would achieve the desired outcome of incentivizing 
the contractor Lo minimi:.::e labor to maximize his ROR. 
would also not add appreciably to the adminisLrative 
requ irements of this contracting method. 
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
1. Interview between Mr. Steve Wiley, Industrial Engineering 
Technician, Pr icefighters, NAVSUP Detachment and the 
researcher, 03 Feb 94. 
2. Interview between Mr. Cullifer, supervisor of Contracts, 
SUPSHIP San Diego and the researcher, 04 Feb 94. 
3. Interview between Ms. Beverly Boogich, Comptroller I P W C 
San Diego CATS Center and the researcher, 04 Feb 94. 
Interview between Ms. Elena Gertes, Contract 
Administrator, NRCC San Diego and the researcher, 
07 Feb 94 . 
5. Interview between Mr. Eugene William, Contract 
Surveillance Team, PWC San Diego CATS Center and the 
researcher I 08 Feb 94. 
6. Interview between Mr. Bog Cengia, Contracting Officer, 
NRCC Detachment Long Beach and the researcher, 09 Feb 94. 
Interview between Mr. Mike Gibson, Associate Director 
Operational Contracting Office, McClelland AFB and the 
researcher, 11 Feb 94. 
8. Interview between Ms. Holly Moore, Administrative 
Contracting Officer, McClel land AFB and the researcher, 
11 & 18 Feb 94. 
9. Interview between Lt Col Fred Mason, Chief of Central 
Contracting Division, McCle lland AFB and the researcher, 
11 Feb 94. 
10. Interview between Mr. Bruce Eades, Acting Chief (PCO) 
Environmental Contracting, McClelland AFB and the 
researcher, 11 Feb 94. 
11. Interview between Mr. Ken Harsha, Procuring Contracting 
Officer, McClelland AFB and the researcher, 14 Feb 94. 
12. Interview between Mr. Gary Bowe, Chief of Contract Policy 
& Pricing Conunittee, McClelland AFB and the researcher, 
1 4 Feb 94. 
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13 Interview between Ms . Diane Webb , Procuring Contracting 
Officer , NRCC Detachment Long Beach and the researcher , 





Position ~~~~~~~~~~ Years experience 
Small Purchase or Large Purchase 
PRE·AWARD RELATED QUESTIONS 
What type of supplies or services are obtained using 
T & M contracts? (i. e. R&D, Repair or overhaul, Services, 
etc. ) Pl ease provide examples. 
2. What frequency are T & M contracts entered into: 
percentage of total contracting actions; total number per 
year; etc.? Please provide any available statistics on 
frequency, dollar amount, etc. 
3. What difficulties have you encountered with T & M 
contracts during pre-awar d? 
4. What factors/characteristics of the T & M contract do you 
feel lead to these difficulties? 
5. What fea t ures do you currently incorporate into the T & M 
contract to help control/mi tigate possible future adverse 
effects? 
6. What checks/balances (incentives/deterrents) ~ a buyer 
use during pre - award to help motivate the contractor to 
perform as efficient l y as possible on a T & M contract? i.e . 
If you could change the regul ations, what would you recommend? 
7. Do you feel T & M contracts are easier to administer than 
normal Cost Reimbursable type contracts? 
8. Do the number of T & M contracts increase (as a %oj in the 
4th quarter (to evaluate if time constraints contribute to 
awarding a quick and easy T & M contract)? 
9. What cr i ter i a do you u se/evaluate to decide whether to use 
a Cost Reimbursab le or T & M con t rac t? 
10. Do y ou use any d i rect .i ves , other than FAR, DF'ARS , 
tor award a t T & M cOlltracts', If so, what aYe t.hey"? 
POST AWARD RELATED QUESTIONS 
1 . What difficulties have you encountered with T & M 
CO::ltracts during post award/contract admini stration? 
2. What factors/charact e ristics of the T & M contract do you 
feel l ead to these difficulties? 
3. What post award surveillance features have you used to 
attempt to contro] the potential !1egative outcomes o f T & M 
contracts? 
4 . What factors do you consider when determining the amount 
and nature of surveillance, including thresholds if 
app licable? 
5. What extent aye COTR 's used to monitor T & M contracts? 
Is t.here a do1 l ar threshol d involved before moni~oring is 
done? 
6. Is a Government represe!1tative r eviewing timesheets f or 
labor hours charged? What frequ ency? 
., . What surve illance ~d, be used during post award for T & 
M contracts to pre v e nt potential negative outcomes? i.e . If 
you could c h ange the r egulat i ons, what would yOIl recommend? 
8. Are there any other comments regarding T & M contracts you 
would l.i ke t o add? 
Source : Developed by Researcher 
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APPENDIX C 
SUPPLIES AND SERVICES PROCI'RED 
IN DON US ING T & M CONTRACTS 
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1993 
Data Run: 03/21/94 
Procuremen:: Management Reporting System (PMRS) 
Total ActionS/Dollars 
By Contract Type (C5 .. Y) 
Fiscal Year 1993 (Oct-Sep) 
TOTAL TOTAL 
NAME/DESCRIPTION ACTIONS DOLLARS 
A&E Inspection Services (Non Construction) 
A&E Production Engineering Services 
Administrative & Service Buildings 
ADP Central Processing Unit Analog 
ADP Components 
ADP Data Entry Services 
ADP Facility Operation & Maintenance Services 
ADP Input/Output and Storage Devices 
ADP Optical Scanning Services 
ADP Support Equipment 
ADP System Acquisition Support Services 
ADP Systems Analysis Services 
ADP Systems Development Services 
ADPE Configura t ion 
Air Freight 
Air Traffic Control Training Facilities 
Antennas, waveguides and Related Equipment 
Architect - Engineer Services (Non Construction) 
Arts/Graphics Services 
Automated Info System Design & Integration Svcs 
Cabinets, Lockers, Bins, and Shelving 
Cable, Cord, Wire Assemblies, Comm. Equipment 
Corrununication Training Devices 
Corrununications Security Equipment and Components 
Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Mfg Svcs 
Data Collection Services 
Disks and Stones, Abrasive 
Education Services 
Educational Services 
Elct CounteLTIleasures & Quick Reaction Eq 
Electrical & Elct Assys, Boards, Cards 
Elevators and Escalators 
Engine Instruments 

































Engineering Technical Services 




NAME/DES CRI PTION 
TOTAL TOTAL 
ACTIONS DOLLARS 
Fire Protection Services 1 $614063 
?light Instruments 187102 
General Health Care Services 69561 
Hazardous Substance Remcval/Cleanup/LJispos l Sves 1 72361 
Information retrieval servi ces 297075 
Insta l lation of Eq/Communicaticn Equipment 24 1261103 
Insta l lation of Eq/Electricl & Elet Equip Camp 322 5155439 6 
Instal l ation of Eq/Misecllaneous Equipment 17722614711 
I nstal l ation of Eq/Training Aids &. Devices 107 9309449 
Launchers, Guided Missile 162000 
Lease or Renta l of Eq/Construction Equipment 31998 
Lease or Rental of Eq/Ships · Sml Craft-Docks 1 87303 
Legal Services 2 123175 
Logistic Support Services 525 77250614 
Machine Shop Sets, Kits, and Outfit s 5 195772 
Maint '" Repair of Eq/ADP Equ ip & Supplies 30 828378 2 
MainL & Repair of Eq/Aircraft Camps & Accys 13 19802 12 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Aircraft Structural Comps 3 474250 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Brushes, Paints, Sea l ers 3 423040 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Communication Equipment 140 21941205 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Elctrcl & Elct Equip Comp 269 23139849 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Engines, Turbines & Camps 3 155763 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Fire ConLrol Equipment 4 132862 
Maint & Repair cf Eq/Fire, Rescue & Safety Equip 1 118362 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Guided Missiles 26 10660644 
Maint & Repair of Eq/InstrumenLs & Lab Equipment 4 999833 
Maint & Repair o f Eq/Maintenance & Rpr Shop Eq 3 2792 19 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Medica l & Dental Equipment 301 37 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Meta lworking Machinery 322720 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Miscel l aneous Equipment 49 63793 75 
Ma i n t & Repair of Eq/Nonmetallic Fabricated Mats 6 28109 5 
Ma int & Repair of Eq/PreFab Structures 195 0 75 
Maint & Repa i r of Eq/Pumps & Compressors 291 20 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Refrigeration, Air Can Eqp 34880 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Service & Trade Equipment 99998 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Ship & Marine Equipment 48 5798926 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Ships-Sml Craft Docks 88 8533187 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Toiletries 337781 
Maint & Repair o~ Eq/Training Aids & Devices 13 264 1 506 
Maint & Repair of Eq/Vehicles · Trailers Cycles 26731 
Maint & Repair of Eq/weapons 2 90375 
Marine Architect Engineer Services 7,53 4.4720882 
Meteorologi cal Instruments and Apparatus 1 27000 
Misce l laneous Comn:unication Equipment 68 6594802 
Miscellaneous Construction Equ i pment 4 0 4900638 
Miscellaneous Fire Control Equipment 1 88640 
Miscellaneous Items 4 2657000 





Mobi 1 i za t ion/ Preparedness Studies 
Modification of Eq/Aircraft Comps & Accys 
Modification of Eq/Instruments & I,ab Equipment 
Modification of Eq/Ship & Marine Equipment 
Modification of Eq/Ships-Sml Craft Docks 
Modification of Eq/Training Aids 5< Devices 
Msc Electrical and Elec tronic Components 
Msl Aircraft Accessories and Components 
Natural Resource Studies 
Non Nuclear Ship Repair (East Coast) 
Non Nuclear Ship Repair (Wes t Coast) 
Office Furniture 
Office Supplies 
Operational Training Devices 
Operations Research Services 
Other Administrative Support Services 
Other ADP 5< Telecorrununication Services 
Other Architect 5< Engineering Services 
Other Education 5< Training Services 
Other Housekeeping Services 
Other Management Support Services 



























Other Photographic Mapping, Printing , 5< Pub Svcs 4 
Other Professional Services 22 
Other Quality Cntl, Testing 5< Inspection Svcs >5 
Other Special Studies and Analysis 
Other Transportation Travel 5< Re location Svcs 
Personnel Testing 
Physical Properties Testing Equipment 
Plumbing Fixtures and Accessories 
Policy Review/Development Services 
Power and Hand Pumps 
Program Evaluation Services 
Program Management/support Services 
Program Review/Development Services 
RADAR Equipment, Except Airborne 
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Radio Navigation Equip, Except Airborne 
ROTE/Aircraft Engineering Development 
ROTE/Electronics 5< Corrununication Eq Advanced Dev 
RDTE/Electronics & Corrununication Eq Engr Devel 
RDTE/Electronics & Commun ication Eq Explor Devel 1 
ROTE/Electronics 5< Corrununication Eq Mgmt & Spprt 1 
ROTE/Electronics & Conrnunicatian Eq Op Sys Dev 1 
RDTE/Math & Computer Sciences Op Sys Develop 3 
RDTE/Misc Hard Goods-Op Systems Development 2 
ROTE/Missile and Space Systems Advanced Develop 6 
RDTE/Missile and Space Systems Explor Develop 1 

























NAME/DESCRIPTION ACTIONS DOLLARS 
ROTE/Other Defense Basic Research 33 $5966498 
ROTE/Other Defense Engineering Development 2 378500 
ROTE/Other Defense Exploratory Development 1837206 
RDTE/Other Defense ManagemenL & Support 13 3188141 
RDTE/Other Oefense Operational Systems Deve l op 1 427381 
RDTE/Other EnvirorunentaJ Protection, Basi c Resrch 2 217594 
ROTE/Other Research and Development,Advd Develop 1 90000 
RDTE/Other Research and Development,Basc Resrch 26 5200549 
ROTE/Other Research and Development, Engr Develop 8 1180081 
ROTE/Other Research and Development , Explor Devel 9 770260 
ROTE/Other Research and Dev elopment,Mgmt & Sprt 36 3949630 
ROTE/OLher Research and Deve l opmenL,Op Sys Dev 1 87934 
ROTE/Other Sciences operational Systems Develop 3 125142 
RDTE/Services, Advanced Development 21 2165434 
RDTE/Se rvices, Engineering Dev elopment 11 1222709 
ROTE/Serv i ces, Exploratory Development 5 1198 1 3 
ROTE/Services, Management & Support 8 498931 
RDTE/Services, Operational Systems Development 26 1827769 
ROTE/Ships , Advanced Development 9 1107883 
ROTE/Ships, Basic Research 6 5525903 
RDTE/Ships. Engineering Development 3 109598 
ROTE/Ship s, Exploratory Development 23 2 656777 
RDTE/Ships, Mar.agement & Support 5 318166 
ROTE/Ships, Op SysLems Development 26 2409840 
ROTE/Textiles, Clothing, Equipage, Advanced Devel 1 613 00 
ROTE/Weapons, Engineering Oevelopment 8 704008 
ROTE/Wea pons, Opera Lional Systems Development 4 260970 
Security Studies (Physical & Personal) 2 511774 
Sets, Kits and Outfits of Measuring Tools 3 1632368 
Ship and Boa t Propulsion Components 1 53723 
Simulation 4 28520 4 
Space Vehicle Components 5 421888 
Specifications Development Services 1 33846 
Systems Engineering Services 186 32268086 
Tech Rep svcs/Bearings 1 43991 
Tech Rep Svcs/Communication Equipment 294 27892479 
Tech Rep Svcs/Electrical & Elct Equip Comps 9 604617 
Tech Rep Svcs/Engines, Turbines & Comps 1 31956 
Tech Rep Svcs/Miscel l aneous Equipment. 13 835233 
Tech Rep Svcs/Ship & Marine Equipment 320958 
Tech Rep Svcs/Training Aids & Devices 426627 
Technica l Assistance 11 777734 
Technology Sharing/Utilization Services 9 7007743 
Technology Studies 22 425578 1 
Telephone and/or Communi caL ions Services 2 182462 
Teletype and Facsimile Equipment 80600 
Toxic Substances Support Services 38122 
Training Aids 2248313 
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NAME / DESCRI PTION 
Training/Curriculum Development 
Underwater Sound Equipment 
Valves , Powered 
Vess e l Fre i ght 
Vocat ional /Techni cal 
Warehou sing & Storage Services 










TOTAL ... ..... .. .. .. ... . ......... . 5195 actions .. . $878,09 0 ,2 1 1 
Source: [Re f . 14) 
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APPENDIX D 
POST AI'I'ARD ORIENTATION CONFERENCE 
SJl.M?LE AGENDA 
In t Todu c t iO:1/ Purpos e 





Delivery Order/Contrac t Administration 
a . Results of I.G. Inspections 
b. QUdlity AssClrance Surveillance 
1) Timecard/Flourchecks 
2) FAR 52 . 215 -2 Audit Negotiations 
3) FAR 52.2<16 · 6 Inspection under T & M contract 
FAR 52.232-7 under T & M contracts 
Clause 
d. Del i very Ord e r Changes 
1) CCJllLraCL ua l Engineering Task Amendments 
2) FAR Dolldr/Schedule Changes 
Subcontract Approval 
Govern:nent Property (T & M) 
L. Trave l Authorization 
1) Procedureo; (CLIN Description) 
2) Per Diem vs. Relocation Costs 
g. Rev ie· .... of Additiona l Contract Clauses 
h. PersonCll vs. Non- Personal Servi ces 




r MOR REVIEW CHECK1IS 'l" 
THE FOLLOWING CHECKLIST CAN BE USED IN REVIEWING THE 
CONTRACTOR' S LABOR AND PAYROLL SYSTEMS. 
1. Does the contractor have written policies and 
procedures in whi ch it communicates to all employees the 
importance of charging the appropriate work order when 
completing time records? Is appropriate guidance given to 
employees to insure against errors in labor charging? 
2. Does the contractor have a policy for recording 
uncompensated labor (mainly overtime of salaried employees) 
where it is considered to be material? This may a ffect the 
amount of indirect expense allocated to contracts. 
3. Are time records required to be completed by the 
employee and approved by his or her supervisor? 
4. Does the internal audit department perform floor 
checks and monitor the charging of labor costs? 
5. Is compensated overtime authorized only where it is 
stipulated in the contract or approved by the contracting 
officer? 
6 . With respect to labor transfer documents: 
a. Are they numerically controlled? 
b. Do they require the signature of the employee 
and the employee' s supervisor approving the transfer prior 
to being processed? 
c. Do they require an explanation of the transfer 
and appropriate supporting data? 
d. Is it required that the documents be processed 
in a timely manner? 
Have procedures been established for the coding and 
recording of idle time? 
8. Is there a written work authorization for all labor 
charged? 
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JOB SITE ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES 
T I MEKEEPING 
1. Before 
dete=ine that 
issued, 1 s a check made to 
are accounted tor? 
:2. [8 the employee prevented from obtaining or 
Teturning rr.ore than one badge? 
for 
the 
4. Is a Jog 
depart a:. irregular 
by the timekeepers 
reported to work when 
of craft employees who arri ve or 
log forwarded directly :'0 :.hc timekeeping 
era::. forcInar:, 
crew member'~ 
daily time records approved by 
:.~meAeeper8 or 
cour.LS of craIL 
apr'YOI,nate personnel 
at work on 
PREPARATION OF PAYROLL 
1. Are 
:.he payroll 
pos:.ed from the daily time records to 
lG3 
2. Are rates entere::l. in the payroll register ::l.etermined 
by reference to the appropriate labor agreements and to the 
daily time records for the tasks perfOrmed? 
3. Are the payroll calculations checked by employees 
who take no part in its preparation? 
4. Is the completed payroll checked against input data? 
5. Before checks are signed, is the completed payroll 
reviewed and approved in writing by the Field Office t>'Bnager 
and/or Resident Construction l>'Bnager? 
Source, [Ref . 41:p. 143) 
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APPENDIX F 
MATERIAL REQUEST CHECKLIST 
TRE FOLLOWING CHECKLIST APPLIES TO CONTRACTOR REQUESTS FOR 
AUTHORIZATION TO PURCHASE MATERIAL UNDER THE REIMBURSABLE 
MATERIAl, LINE ITEM ON A TIME & MATERIALS TYPE CONTRACT. 
Will the material requested be consumed i n t:le manufac -
ture at a prototype iII support of t.he de l iverable data 
i tem in t he schedule? It YES, go ::'0 2. If NO, go to 7. 
2. Is t he material necessary for performance on the order? 
I t YES, go to 3. If NO, go t o 7. 
3. Is the mat erial ADF? If YES, go t o 4. I f NO, go to 5 . 
Is t he ADP designated a Mission Critical Computer 
Resource IMCCR)? If YES, go to 5 . If NO, go to ., . 
See NOTE. 
Can the material be provided as GFP? lf YES, go Lo 6. 
If NO, go to 8. 
6. The maLerial authorizat i on should be denied and the 
mater i al provided by the Gove rnment. 
7. The material purchase should be denied as it is not 
properl y a reimbursabl e item under the contract. 
8. Is the proposed cost of the ma t erial reasonable'? If 
YES, go to 9. I f NO, go to 10 . 
9 . The material purchase request should be approved. 
10. The ma terial purchase request should be disapproved, and 
discussions hel d wi th the contractor to resolve the 
difference in proposed and reasonable c osts. Once Lhe 
cost i ssl<e has been resolved, the reques t should be 
approved. 
NOTE: For more information on MCCR, see Publi c Law 97· 
86, 1 0 U .S.C. 231 5 , t he Nunn Warner Amendment to 
Brooks Act. 
Source; [Ref. 42 J 
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